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This paper examines the properties of instrumental variables (IV) applied to models with essential
heterogeneity, that is, models where responses to interventions are heterogeneous and agents adopt
treatments (participate in programs) with at least partial knowledge of their idiosyncratic response.
We analyze two-outcome and multiple-outcome models including ordered and unordered choice models.
We allow for transition-specific and general instruments. We generalize previous analyses by developing
weights for treatment effects for general instruments. We develop a simple test for the presence of
essential heterogeneity. We note the asymmetry of the model of essential heterogeneity: outcomes
of choices are heterogeneous in a general way; choices are not. When both choices and outcomes are
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Suppose a policy is proposed for adoption in a country. It has been tried in other countries and we
know outcomes there. We also know outcomes in countries where it was not adopted. From the
historical record, what can we conclude about the likely eﬀectiveness of the policy in countries that
have not implemented it?
To answer this question, we build a model of counterfactuals. Let Y0 be the outcome of a country
(e.g. GDP) under a no policy regime. Y1 is the outcome if the policy is implemented. Y1 − Y0 is
the treatment eﬀect of the policy. It may vary among countries. We observe characteristics X of
various countries (e.g. level of democracy, level of population literacy, etc.). It is convenient to
decompose Y1 into its mean given X, μ1(X), and deviation from mean, U1. We can make a similar
decomposition for Y0:
Y1 = μ1(X)+U1 (1)
Y0 = μ0(X)+U0.
It may happen that controlling for the X, Y1 − Y0 is the same for all countries. This is the case of
homogenous treatment eﬀects given X. More likely, countries vary in their response to the policy
even after controlling for X.
Figure 1 plots the distribution of Y1−Y0 for a benchmark X. We explain the various parameters
m e n t i o n e di nt h eﬁgure later on. The special case of homogeneity arises when the distribution
collapses to its mean. It would be ideal if we could estimate the distribution of Y1−Y0 given X and
there is research that does this.1 More often, economists focus on some mean of the distribution
displayed in Figure 1 and use a regression framework to interpret the data. To turn (1) into a
regression model, it is conventional to use a switching regression framework. Deﬁne D =1if a
country adopts a policy; D =0if it does not. The observed outcome, Y ,i sY = DY1 +( 1− D)Y0.
1See Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2001, 2003), Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005, 2006) and the survey
in Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006).
1Substituting (1) into this expression, and keeping all X implicit, we obtain
Y = Y0 +( Y1 − Y0)D (2)
= μ0 +( μ1 − μ0 + U1 − U0)D + U0.
Using conventional regression notation,
Y = α + βD+ ε (3)
where α = μ0, β =( Y1−Y0)=μ1−μ0+U1−U0 and ε = U0.T h ec o e ﬃcient on D is the “treatment
eﬀect.”The case where β is the same for every country is the one conventionally assumed. More
elaborate versions assume that β depends on X and estimate interactions of D with X.T h e
case where β varies even after accounting for X is called the “random coeﬃcient”or “heterogenous
treatment eﬀect”case. A great deal of attention has been focused on this case in recent decades.
The case where β (given X) is the same for every country is the familiar one and we develop
it ﬁrst. A least squares regression of Y on D (equivalently a mean diﬀerence in outcomes between
countries with D =1and countries with D =0 ), is possibly subject to a selection bias.C o u n t r i e s
that adopt the policy may be atypical in terms of their Y0 (= α + ε). Thus if countries that would
have done well in terms of unobservable ε (= U0) even in the absence of the policy are the ones
that adopt the policy, β estimated from OLS (or its nonparametric version–matching) is upward
biased because Cov(D,ε) > 0.
Two main approaches have been adopted to solve this problem: (a) selection models (Gronau,
1974; Heckman, 1974, 1976a,b, 1979; Heckman and Robb, 1985, 1986; Powell, 1994) and (b) instru-
mental variable models (Heckman and Robb, 1985, 1986; Imbens and Angrist, 1994; Angrist and
Imbens, 1995; Manski and Pepper, 2000; Heckman and Vytlacil, 1999, 2000, 2005).2 This paper
2Matching is also used. It is a form of nonparametric least squares that assumes that all relevant unobservables are
accurately proxied by the observables X that the analyst happens to have at his or her disposal, so (Y0,Y 1) ⊥ ⊥ D | X
(alternatively that (ε,β) ⊥ ⊥ D | X), where A ⊥ ⊥ B | C means that A is independent of B given C. See Heckman and
Navarro (2004) for a discussion of matching.
2focuses on the instrumental variable (IV) approach and establishes the relationship between the
selection and IV approach using a prototypical economic model. The selection approach models
levels of conditional means. The IV approach models the slopes of the conditional means. IV does
not identify the constants estimated in selection models. In the general case with heterogeneity,
when IV is used to identify the same level parameters that are identiﬁed by control function or
selection methods, it is necessary to make the same assumptions about levels outcomes in limit sets
(“identiﬁcation at inﬁnity”) as are made in selection models.
For the case with homogeneous responses, if there is an instrument Z with the properties that
Cov(Z,D) 6=0 (4)
Cov(Z,ε)=0 (5)
then standard IV identiﬁes β, at least in large samples:




If other instruments exist, each identiﬁes β. Z produces a controlled variation in D relative to ε.
Randomization of assignment with full compliance with experimental protocols is an example of an
instrument. From the instrumental variable estimator, we can identify the eﬀect of adopting the
policy in any country since all countries respond to the policy in the same way, controlling for their
X.
If β (= Y1 − Y0) varies in the population even after controlling for X, there is a distribution
of responses that cannot in general be summarized by a single number. Even if we are interested
in the mean of the distribution, a new phenomenon distinct from selection bias might arise. This
3The proof is straightforward. Under general conditions (see, e.g. White, 1984),
plim ˆ βIV = β +
Cov(Z,ε)
Cov(Z,D)
and the second term on the right hand side vanishes.
3is the problem of sorting on the gain which is distinct from sorting on the level. If β varies, even
after controlling for X, there may be sorting on the gain (Cov(β,D) 6=0 ). This is the model of
essential heterogeneity.
The application of instrumental variables to this case is more problematic. Suppose that we
augment the standard instrumental variable assumptions (4) and (5) by the following assumption:
Cov(Z,β)=0 . (6)
Can we identify the mean of (Y1 − Y0) using IV? In general we cannot.4
To see why, let ¯ β =( μ1 − μ0) be the mean treatment eﬀect (the mean of the distribution in
Figure 1). β = ¯ β + η,w h e r eU1 − U0 = η. Write equation (3) in terms of this parameter:
Y = α + ¯ βD+[ ε + ηD].
The error term of this equation (ε + ηD) contains two components. By assumption, Z is uncorre-
lated with ε and η. But to identify ¯ β,w en e e dI Vt ob eu n c o r r e l a t e dw i t h[ε + ηD].T h a tr e q u i r e s
Z to be uncorrelated with ηD.
If policy adoption is made without knowledge of η (= U1 −U0), the idiosyncratic gain to policy
adoption after controlling for the observables, then η and D are statistically independent and hence
uncorrelated, and IV identiﬁes ¯ β.5 If, however, policy adoption is made with partial or full knowledge
of η,I Vd o e sn o ti d e n t i f y¯ β because E(ηD | Z)=E(η | D =1 ,Z)Pr(D =1| Z) and if there
is sorting on the unobserved gain η,t h eﬁrst term is not zero. Similar calculations show that IV
does not identify the mean gain to the countries that adopt the policy (E (β | D =1 ) )and many
4This point was made by Heckman and Robb (1985, 1986). See also Heckman (1997).
5Proof:
plim ˆ βIV = ¯ β +
Cov(Z,ε + ηD)
Var (D,Z)
But Cov(Z,ε + ηD)=C o v ( Z,ε)+C o v( Z,ηD) and Cov(Z,ηD)=E (ZηD) − E (Z)E (ηD), E (ηD)=0by the
assumed independence. E (ZηD)=E (η)E (ZD) by the assumed independence and hence E (ZηD)=0since
E (η)=0 .
4other summary treatment parameters.6 Whether η (= U1 − U0) is correlated with D depends on
the quality of the data available to the empirical economist, and cannot be settled a priori. The
conservative position is to allow for such correlation. However, this rules out IV as an interesting
econometric strategy for identifying any of the familiar mean treatment parameters.
It is remarkable then that under certain conditions Imbens and Angrist (1994) establish that in
the model with essential heterogeneity standard IV can identify an interpretable parameter. The
parameter they identify is a discrete approximation to the marginal gain parameter introduced by
Björklund and Moﬃtt (1987). Those authors demonstrate how to use a selection model to identify
the marginal gain to persons induced into a treatment status by a marginal change in the cost
of treatment. Imbens and Angrist (1994) show how to identify a discrete approximation to this
parameter using instrumental variables.
They assume the existence of an instrument Z that takes two or more distinct values. This
is implicit in (4). If Z assumes only one value, the covariance would be zero. Strengthening the
covariance conditions of equations (5) and (6), they assume that Z is independent of β (= Y1 − Y0)
and Y0.L e t “ ⊥ ⊥”denote independence. Denote by D(z) the random variable indicating receipt
of treatment when Z is set to z.( D(z)=1if treatment is received; D(z)=0otherwise). The
Imbens-Angrist independence assumption can be written as




where Z i st h es e to fp o s s i b l ev a l u e so fZ.( Independence)
They also assume that
(IV-2) Pr(D =1| Z) depends on Z (Rank).
This is a standard rank condition. They supplement the standard IV assumption with what they
call a “monotonicity”assumption. It is a condition across persons. This assumption maintains that
if Z is ﬁxed ﬁrst at one and then at the other of two distinct values, Z = z and Z = z0,a l lp e r s o n s
respond to the change in Z in the same way. In our policy adoption example, it states that a
6See Heckman and Robb (1985, 1986), Heckman (1997) or Heckman and Vytlacil (1999).
5movement from z to z0 causes all countries to move toward (or against) adoption of the policy being
studied. If some adopt, others do not drop the policy in response to the same change.
More formally, letting Di (z) be the indicator (=1if adopted; =0if not) for adoption of a
policy if Z = z for country i, for any distinct values z and z0, Imbens and Angrist (1994) assume
(IV-3) Di (z) ≥ Di (z0) for all i or Di (z) ≤ Di (z0) for all i, i =1 ,...,I.( Monotonicity or
Uniformity)
The content in this assumption is not in the order for any person. Rather, the responses have to
be uniform across people for a given choice of z and z0. One possibility allowed under (IV-3) is the
existence of three values z<z 0 <z 00 such that, for all i, Di (z) ≥ Di (z0) but Di (z0) ≤ Di (z00).
The standard usage of the term monotonicity rules out this possibility by requiring that one of
the following hold for all i:( a ) z<z 0 componentwise implies Di (z) ≥ Di (z0) or (b) z<z 0
componentwise implies Di (z) ≤ Di (z0). Of course, if the Di (z) are monotonic in the standard
usage, they are monotonic in the sense of Imbens and Angrist.
For any value of z0 in the domain of deﬁnition of Z, from (IV-1) and (IV-2) and the deﬁnition of
D(z), (Y0,Y 1,D(z0)) is independent of Z. For any two values of the instrument Z = z and Z = z0,
we may write
E (Y | Z = z) − E (Y | Z = z
0)
= E(Y0 + D(Y1 − Y0) | Z = z)
−E (Y0 + D(Y1 − Y0) | Z = z
0)
= E(D(Y1 − Y0) | Z = z)
−E (D(Y1 − Y0) | Z = z
0).
From the independence condition (IV-1) and the deﬁnition of D(z) and D(z0),w em a yw r i t et h i s
6expression as E [(Y1 − Y0)(D(z) − D(z0))]. Using the law of iterated expectations,
E (Y | Z = z) − E (Y | Z = z
0) (7)
= E (Y1 − Y0 | D(z) − D(z
0)=1 )P r( D(z) − D(z
0)=1 )
−E (Y1 − Y0 | D(z) − D(z
0)=−1)Pr(D(z) − D(z
0)=−1).
By the monotonicity condition (IV-3), we eliminate one or the other term in this ﬁnal expression.
Suppose that Pr(D(z) − D(z0)=−1) = 0,t h e n
E (Y | Z = z) − E (Y | Z = z
0)
= E (Y1 − Y0 | D(z) − D(z
0)=1 )P r( D(z) − D(z
0)=1 ).
Dividing by Pr(D(z)−D(z0)=1 )=P r ( D =1| Z = z)−Pr(D =1| Z = z0) for values of z and z0
that produce distinct propensity scores, we obtain LATE:
LATE =
E (Y | Z = z) − E (Y | Z = z0)
Pr(D =1| Z = z) − Pr(D =1| Z = z0)
(8)
= E (Y1 − Y0 | D(z) − D(z
0)=1 ).
This is the mean gain to those induced to switch from “0”to “1”by a change in Z from z0 to z.
This is not the mean of Y1 − Y0 (average treatment eﬀect) unless the Z assume values (z,z0)
such that Pr(D(z)) = 1 and Pr(D(z0)) = 0.7 It is also not the eﬀect of treatment on the treated
(E(Y1 − Y0 | D =1 )=E(β | D =1 ) ) unless the analyst has access to and uses one or more values
of z such that Pr(D(z)=1 )=1 .
LATE depends on the particular instrument used.8 The parameter is deﬁned by a hypothetical
manipulation of instruments. If monotonicity (uniformity) is violated, IV estimates an average
7Such values of Z produce “identiﬁcation at inﬁnity,”or more accurately, limit points where P (z)=1and
P (z0)=0 .
8Dependence of the estimands on the choices of IV used to estimate models with essential heterogeneity was ﬁrst
noted in Heckman and Robb (1985, 1986).
7response of those induced to switch into the program and those induced to switch out of the
program by the change in the instrument because both terms in (7) are present.9
If the analyst is interested in knowing the average response (¯ β), the eﬀect of the policy on the
outcomes of countries that adopt it (E(β | D =1 ) )o rt h ee ﬀect of the policy if a particular country
adopts it, there is no guarantee that the IV estimator comes any closer to the desired target than
the OLS estimator and indeed it may be more biased than OLS. Since diﬀerent instruments deﬁne
diﬀerent parameters, having a wealth of diﬀerent strong instruments does not improve the precision
of the estimate of any particular parameter. This is in stark contrast with the traditional model
with β ⊥ ⊥ D. In that case, all valid instruments identify ¯ β. The Durbin (1954)-Wu (1973)-Hausman
(1978) test for the validity of extra instruments applies to the traditional model. In the more general
case with essential heterogeneity, since diﬀerent instruments estimate diﬀerent parameters, no clear
inference emerges from these speciﬁcation tests.
When dealing with more than two distinct values of Z, Imbens and Angrist (1994) draw on the
analysis of Yitzhaki (1989), which was reﬁned in Yitzhaki (1996) and Yitzhaki and Schechtman
(2004), to produce a weighted average of pairwise LATE parameters where the scalar Z are ordered
to deﬁne the LATE parameter. In this case IV is a weighted average of LATE parameters with
non-negative weights.10 Imbens and Angrist generalize this result to the case of vector Z assuming
that instruments are monotonic functions of the probability of selection.
This paper and our previous analysis build on the pioneering work of Yitzhaki and Imbens and
Angrist.11 We make the following contributions to this literature.
1. We relate the LATE-IV approach to economic choice models. Using a choice theoretic pa-
rameter (the marginal treatment eﬀect or MTE) introduced into the literature on selection
9Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996) consider the case of two way ﬂows for the special case of a scalar instrument
when the monotonicity assumption is violated. Their analysis is a version of Yitzhaki’s (1989, 1996) analysis. He
analyzes the net eﬀect whereas they break the net eﬀect into two components corresponding to the two way ﬂows.
10We place the unpublished Yitzhaki (1989) paper at our website and summarize his essential ideas in Section 3.2
and Appendix C. He shows that two stage least squares estimators of Y on P (Z)=E (D | Z),i d e n t i f yw e i g h t e d
averages of terms like the second terms in (8) with positive weights. See also Yitzhaki (1996) and Yitzhaki and
Schechtman (2004).
11See Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2001c, 2005).
8models by Björklund and Moﬃtt (1987), it is possible to generate all treatment eﬀe c t sa sd i f -
ferent weighted averages of the MTE or of LATE. Standard linear IV can also be interpreted
as a weighted average of MTE or LATE. Using the economic model, MTE is a limit form of
LATE and LATE in turn is a discrete approximation to MTE, or the marginal gain function
of Björklund and Moﬃtt (1987). A local version of instrumental variables (LIV for Local
Instrumental Variables), distinct from standard instrumental variables, identiﬁes the MTE.
These theoretical constructs can be deﬁned independently of the data.
2. We establish the central role of the propensity score (Pr(D =1| Z = z)=P(z))i nb o t h
selection and IV models.12
3. We show that with vector Z, and a scalar instrument constructed from Z (e.g. J(Z)), the
weights on LATE and MTE that are implicit in standard IV are not guaranteed to be non-
negative. Thus IV can be negative even though all pairwise LATEs and pointwise MTEs are
positive. Certain instruments produce positive weights and avoid this interpretive problem.
Our analysis generalizes that of Yitzhaki and Imbens-Angrist who analyze the case with
positive weights.
4. We show the special status of P(z) as an instrument. It always produces non-negative weights
for MTE and LATE. It enables analysts to identify MTE or LATE. With knowledge of P(z),
and the MTE or LATE, we can decompose any standard IV estimate into identiﬁable MTEs (at
points) or LATEs (over intervals) and identiﬁable weights on MTE or LATE, where the weights
can be constructed from data. This ability to decompose IV into interpretable components
allows analysts to determine the response to treatment of persons at diﬀerent levels of the
unobserved factors that determine treatment status.
5. We present a simple test for essential heterogeneity (β dependent on D)t h a ta l l o w sa n a l y s t s
to determine whether or not they can avoid the complexities that arise in the more general
12Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) establish the central role of the propensity score in matching models. Heckman
and Robb (1985, 1986) and Heckman (1980) establish the central role of the propensity score in selection models.
See also Ahn and Powell (1993) and Powell (1994).
9model with heterogeneity in response to treatments.
6. We extend the analysis of IV to models with more than two outcomes. Angrist and Imbens
(1995) analyze an ordered choice model with a scalar instrument that aﬀects choices at all
margins. They show that in an ordered model with multiple outcomes, IV identiﬁes a “causal
parameter.”Their causal parameter is a weighted average of parameters that are diﬃcult to
interpret as willingness-to-pay parameters or answers to well deﬁned choice problems. We
present an economically interpretable decomposition of standard IV into willingness-to-pay
components for persons at well deﬁned margins of choice. We show how to identify these
components from data and how to construct the weights. We introduce transition speciﬁc
instruments. We generalize this analysis to an unordered choice model.
7. We show the fundamental asymmetry in the recent IV literature for models with heteroge-
neous outcomes. Responses to treatment are permitted to be heterogeneous in a general way.
Responses of choices to instruments are not. When heterogeneity in choice is allowed for in a
g e n e r a lw a y ,I Va n dl o c a lI Vd on o te s t i m a t einterpretable treatment parameters.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the IV approach to estimating choice
models. Section 3 introduces a general model with essential heterogeneity and presents its implica-
tions. Section 4 compares selection and IV models and shows that LIV estimates the derivative of a
selection model. Section 5 presents theoretical and empirical examples of the model with essential
heterogeneity. Section 6 extends the analysis to multiple outcome models. Section 7 allows choice
responses to be heterogeneous in a general way. Section 8 concludes.
2I V i n C h o i c e M o d e l s
We adjoin a choice equation to outcome equations (1) and (2). A standard binary threshold crossing
model for D writes
D = 1[D
∗ > 0], (9)
10where 1[·] is an indicator (1[A]=1if A true; 0 otherwise).
A familiar case is
D
∗ = γZ − V (10)
where (V ⊥ ⊥ Z) | X (V is independent of Z given X). The propensity score or choice probability is
P(z)=P r ( D =1| Z = z)=P r ( γz > V)=FV(γz)
where FV is the distribution of V which is assumed to be continuous. In terms of the Generalized Roy
model where C is the cost of participation in sector 1, D = 1[Y1−Y0−C>0]. For a separable model
in outcomes (1) and in costs C = μC (W)+UC, Z =( X,W), μD (Z)=μ1 (X) − μ0 (X) − μC (W),
V = −(U1 − U0 − UC). In constructing examples, we use a special version where UC =0 .W ec a l l
this version the extended Roy model.13 Our analysis, however, applies to more general models.
In the case where β (given X) is a constant under (IV-1) and (IV-2), it is not necessary to specify
the choice model to identify β. We show that in a general model with heterogenous responses, the
speciﬁcation of P(z) and its relationship with the instrument play crucial roles. To see this, study
the covariance between Z and ηD discussed in the introduction. By the law of iterated expectations,
letting ¯ Z denote the mean of Z
Cov(Z,ηD)=E
¡¡






Z − ¯ Z
¢





Z − ¯ Z
¢
η | γZ > V
¢
Pr(γZ > V).
Thus even if Z and η are independent, they are not independent conditional on D = 1[γZ > V]
if η (= U1 − U0)i sd e p e n d e n to nV (i.e., if the decision maker has partial knowledge of η and acts
on it). Selection models allow for this dependence (see Heckman and Robb (1985, 1986); Ahn and
13The generalized Roy model allows UC 6=0 .
11Powell (1993); Powell (1994)). Keeping X implicit and assuming that
(U1,U 0,V) ⊥ ⊥ Z (11)
(alternatively that (ε,η) ⊥ ⊥ Z), we obtain E(Y | D =0 ,Z = z)=E(Y0 | D =0 ,Z = z)=
α + E(U0 | γz < V) which can be written as
E(Y | D =0 ,Z= z)=α + K0(P(z)),
where the functional form of K0 is produced from the distribution of (U0,V). (This representation
is derived in Heckman, 1980; Heckman and Robb, 1985, 1986; Ahn and Powell, 1993; Powell, 1994.)
Similarly,
E (Y | D =1 ,Z= z)=E (Y1 | D =1 ,Z= z)
= α + ¯ β + E (U1 | γz > V)
= α + ¯ β + K1(P(z)),
where K0(P(z)) and K1(P(z)) are control functions in the sense of Heckman and Robb (1985, 1986).
Under standard conditions, we can identify ¯ β. Powell (1994) discusses semiparametric identiﬁcation.
Because we condition on Z = z (or P(z)), correct speciﬁcation of the Z plays an important role in
econometric selection methods. This sensitivity to the full set of instruments in Z appears to be
absent from the IV method.
If β is a constant (given X), or if η (= β − ¯ β)i si n d e p e n d e n to fV ,o n l yo n ei n s t r u m e n tf r o m
vector Z needs to be used. Missing instruments play no role in identifying mean responses but
may aﬀect the eﬃciency of the IV estimation. We establish that in a model where β is variable
and not independent of V , misspeciﬁcation of Z plays an important role in interpreting what IV
estimates analogous to its role in selection models. Misspeciﬁcation of Z aﬀects both approaches
to identiﬁcation. This is a new phenomenon in models with heterogenous β. We now review some
12results established in the preceding literature that form the platform on which we build.
3 A General Model with Essential Heterogeneity in Out-
comes
We now exposit the selection model developed in Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2001b, 2005). Their
model for counterfactuals (potential outcomes) is more general than (1) and allows for nonseparable
errors:
Y1 = μ1 (X,U1), (12)
Y0 = μ0 (X,U0),
where X are observed and (U1,U 0) are unobserved by the analyst. The X may be dependent on U0
and U1 in a general way. This model is designed to evaluate policies in place and not to extrapolate
to new environments characterized by X.14 The observed outcome is produced by equation (2).
Choices are generated by a standard discrete choice model. We generalize choice model (9) and
(10) for D∗, a latent utility,15
D
∗ = μD (Z) − V and D = 1[D
∗ ≥ 0]. (13)
μD (Z) − V can be interpreted as a net utility for a person with characteristics (Z,V ). If it is
positive, D =1and the person selects into treatment; D =0otherwise. Section 7 discusses
the important role played by additive separability in the recent instrumental variable literature on
essential heterogeneity.
In terms of the notation used in Section 1, β = Y1−Y0 = μ1 (X,U1)−μ0 (X,U0). A special case
that links our analysis to standard models in econometrics writes Y1 = Xβ1+U1 and Y0 = Xβ0+U0
14See Heckman and Vytlacil (2005, 2007a) for a study of exogeneity requirements for X in answering diﬀerent
policy questions.
15A large class of latent index, threshold crossing models will have this representation. See Vytlacil (2006a).
13so β = X (β1 − β0)+(U1 − U0). In the case of separable outcomes, heterogeneity in β arises because
in general U1 6= U0 and people diﬀer in their X.16
Following Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) we assume:
(A-1) (U0,U 1,V) are independent of Z conditional on X (Independence Condition for IV).
(A-2) The distribution of μD (Z) conditional on X is nondegenerate (Rank Condition for IV).17
(A-3) The distribution of V is continuous.18
(A-4) E |Y1| < ∞,a n dE |Y0| < ∞ (Finite Means).
(A-5) 1 > Pr(D =1| X) > 0 (For each X there is a treatment group and a comparison
group).
(A-6) Let X0 denote the counterfactual value of X t h a tw o u l dh a v eb e e no b s e r v e di fD is set to 0.
X1 is deﬁned analogously. Thus Xd = X, for d =0 ,1 (The Xd are invariant to counterfactual
manipulations).
(A-1) and (A-2) generalize (IV-1) and (IV-2) respectively. (A-3) is a technical condition made
for convenience and is easily relaxed at some notational cost. (A-4) is needed to use standard
integration theorems and to have the mean treatment eﬀect parameters be well deﬁned. (A-5) is a
standard requirement for any evaluation estimator that for each value of X,t h e r eb es o m ew h oa r e
treated and some who are not. (A-6) is the requirement that receipt of treatment does not aﬀect
the realized value X, so we identify a full treatment eﬀect when we condition on X instead of a
treatment eﬀect that conditions on variables aﬀected by treatment. This assumption can be relaxed
by redeﬁning the treatment to a set of outcomes corresponding to each Xd state.
The separability between V and μD(Z) in the choice equation is conventional. It plays a crucial
role in justifying instrumental variable estimators in models with essential heterogeneity. It implies
monotonicity (uniformity) condition (IV-3) from choice equation (13). Fixing Z at two diﬀerent
16In nonseparable cases, heterogeneity arises conditional on X even if U1 = U0 = U.
17μD(·) is assumed to be a measurable function of Z given X.
18The distribution is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure.
14values moves D(Z) in the same direction for everyone. Vytlacil (2002) shows that under indepen-
dence, rank and some regularity conditions, monotonicity (IV-3) implies the existence of a V in
representation (13). Thus the IV model for the general case and the economic choice model turn
out to have identical representations. Independence assumption (A-1), produces the condition that
everywhere Z enters the model only through P(Z).T h i si sc a l l e di n d e xs u ﬃciency.
Without any loss of generality, following the same argument surrounding (9) and (10), we may
write the model for D using the distribution of V , FV,a s
D = 1[FV (μD (Z)) >F V (V )] = 1[P (Z) >U D], (14)
where UD = FV (V ) and P (Z)=FV (μD(Z)) = Pr(D =1| Z), the propensity score. Because FV is
assumed to be a continuous distribution, FV is a strictly monotonic transformation that preserves
the information in the original inequality. Note that UD is uniformly distributed by construction
(UD ∼ Unif[0,1]).
3.1 LATE, The Marginal Treatment Eﬀect and Instrumental Variables
To understand what IV estimates in the model with general heterogeneity in response to treatment,
we deﬁne the marginal treatment eﬀect (or MTE) conditional on X and UD:19
∆
MTE(x,uD)=E(Y1 − Y0 | X = x,UD = uD)
= E (β | X = x,V = v),
for β = Y1 − Y0 and v = F
−1
V (uD), where we use both general notation and the regression speciﬁc
notation interchangeably to anchor our analysis both in the treatment eﬀect literature and in
19As previously noted, the concept of the marginal treatment eﬀect and the limit form of LATE were ﬁrst introduced
in the literature in the context of a parametric normal Generalized Roy Selection model by Björklund and Moﬃtt
(1987).
15conventional econometrics. To simplify the notation, we keep the conditioning on X implicit except
when clarity of exposition dictates otherwise. Since P (Z) is a monotonic transformation of the
mean net utility μD (Z),a n dUD is a monotonic function of V ,w h e nw ee v a l u a t e∆MTE(uD) at
the value P(z)=uD, it is the marginal return to agents with Z = z characteristics who are just
indiﬀerent between sector 1 and sector 0. In other words, at this point of evaluation, ∆MTE(uD)
is the gross gain of going from “0” to “1” for agents who are indiﬀerent between the sectors when
their mean utility given Z = z is μD (z)=v,s oμD (z)−v =0which is equivalent to the event that
P (z)=FV (μD (z)) = FV (v)=uD.W h e nY1 and Y0 are denominated in value units, the MTE is
a willingness-to-pay measure for persons with characteristics Z = z at the speciﬁed margin.
Under assumptions (A-1) to (A-5), Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005) show that all treatment
parameters, matching estimators, IV estimators based on J (Z), a scalar function of Z,a n dO L S
estimators can be written as weighted averages of the MTE. Tables 1A and 1B summarize their
results for characterizing treatment eﬀects and estimators and the weights given data on P (Z),D
and the instrument J (Z). We discuss the weights for IV in the next subsection. We show how to
construct these weights at our website, where software for doing so is available.20 Heckman and
Vytlacil (2001b, 2007b) show that these weights can be constructed and the relationships among
the parameters shown in Tables 1A and 1B hold even if a nonseparable choice model, instead of
(13), is used and even if assumption (A-2) is weakened. We discuss this result in Section 7.
Notice that when ∆MTE does not depend on uD, all of the treatment eﬀects are the same and
that, under our assumptions, IV estimates all of them. In this case, ∆MTE can be taken outside the
integral and the weights all integrate to one. Thus, E(Y1 −Y0 | X = x)=ATE = E(Y1 − Y0 | X =
x,D =1 )=TT = MTE, and we are back to the conventional model of homogeneous responses.
T h i si n c l u d e st h ec a s ew h e r eη is nondegenerate but independent of D.
The parameters MTE and LATE are closely related. Using the deﬁnition of D(z) in (IV-3), let
Z(x) denote the support of the distribution of Z conditional on X = x. For any (z,z0) ∈ Z(x)×Z(x)
20See jenni.uchicago.edu/underiv/.
16so that P(z) >P(z0), under (IV-3) and independence (A-1), LATE is:
∆
LATE (z
0,z)=E (Y1 − Y0 | D(z)=1 ,D(z
0)=0 ), (15a)
i.e., the mean outcome in terms of Y1 −Y0 for persons who would be induced to switch from D =0
to D =1if Z were manipulated externally from z0 to z. As a consequence of Vytlacil’s (2002)
theorem, LATE can be written as
E (Y1 − Y0 | D(z)=1 ,D(z
0)=0 ) (15b)
= E (Y1 − Y0 | u
0






where uD =P r ( D(z)=1 )=P r ( D =1| Z = z)=P(z),u 0
D =P r ( D(z0)=1| Z = z0)=
Pr(D(z0)=1 )=P(z0).21 In the limit, as u0
D → uD,L A T Ec o n v e r g e st oM T E .
Imbens and Angrist (1994) deﬁne the LATE parameter from hypothetical manipulations of an
instrument. Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005) draw on choice theory and deﬁne the parameters in
terms of the generalized Roy Model. Their link helps to understand what IV estimates and relates
IV to choice models. We work with deﬁnition (15b) throughout the rest of this paper. It enables
us to identify the margin of UD selected by instruments, something currently not possible in results
in the previous literature on IV.
The MTE can be identiﬁed by taking derivatives of E (Y | Z = z) with respect to P (z) (see
Heckman and Vytlacil, 1999).22 This derivative is called the local instrumental variable (LIV). For
the model of general heterogeneity, under assumptions (A-1) to (A-5), we can write (keeping the
conditioning on X = x implicit)
E (Y | Z = z)=E(Y | P(Z)=p)
21Assumption (A-1) implies that Pr(D(z)=1 )=P r( D =1| Z = z),a n dPr(D(z0)=1 )=P r( D =1| Z = z0).
22See also Heckman and Vytlacil (2005, 2007b).
17E (Y | P(Z)=p)=E (DY1 +( 1− D)Y0 | P (Z)=p)
= E(Y0)+E (D(Y1 − Y0) | P (Z)=p)








E (Y | P (Z)=p)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
P(z)=p
= E(Y1 − Y0|UD = p). (16)
Expression (16) shows how the derivative of E (Y | Z = z), which is the local instrumental variable
(LIV) estimand of Heckman and Vytlacil (1999), identiﬁes the marginal treatment eﬀect (the right
hand side of this expression) over the support of P (Z). Observe that a high value of P (Z)=p
identiﬁes MTE at a value of UD = uD that is high, i.e. that is associated with nonparticipation. It
takes a high p to compensate for the high UD = uD and bring the agent to indiﬀerence (see equation
14). Thus high p values identify returns to persons whose unobservables make them less likely to
participate in the program. Software for estimating MTE using local linear regression is described
in Appendix B and is available online at jenni.uchicago.edu/underiv.
Under the special case where β ⊥ ⊥ D (no essential heterogeneity), Y is linear in P (Z):
E (Y | Z)=a + bP (Z), (17)
where b = ∆MTE = ∆ATE = ∆TT. This representation holds whether or not Y1 and Y0 are separable
in U1 and U0, respectively (see Heckman and Vytlacil, 2001b, 2007b). Thus a test of the linearity
of the conditional expectation of Y in terms of P (Z) is a test of whether the conventional model
or the model of essential heterogeneity generates the data. One useful empirical strategy is to test
for linearity using the variety of tests developed in the literature and to determine whether the
additional complexity introduced by the model of essential heterogeneity is warranted.
Using the formulae presented in Tables 1A and 1B, all of the traditional treatment parameters
as well as the IV estimator using P (Z) as an instrument can be identiﬁed as weighted averages of
18∆MTE(uD) if P (Z) has full support. The weights can be constructed from data. If P (Z) does not
have full support, simple tight bounds on these parameters can be constructed.23
3.2 Understanding What IV Estimates














E (J (Z) − E (J (Z)) | P (Z) >u D)Pr(P (Z) >u D)
Cov(J (Z),D)
. (19)
In this expression uD is a number between zero and one. This weight depends on the choice prob-
ability P (Z). For a derivation see Appendix A. The derivation does not impose any assumptions
on the distribution of J(Z) or P(Z).N o t i c e t h a t J(Z) and P(Z) d on o th a v et ob ec o n t i n u o u s
random variables, and that the functional forms of P(Z) and J(Z) are general.24
For ease of exposition, we initially assume that J(Z) and P(Z) are both continuous. This
assumption plays no essential role in any of the results of this paper and we develop the discrete





(j − E(J (Z)))
R 1
uD fJ,P (j,t) dtdj
Cov(J (Z),D)
, (20)
where fJ,P is the joint density of J(Z) and P(Z) and we implicitly condition on X.T h ew e i g h t sc a n
be negative or positive. Observe that ω(0) = 0 and ω(1) = 0. The weights integrate to 1,25 so even
if the weight is negative over some intervals, it must be positive over other intervals. When there is
one instrument (Z is a scalar), and assumptions (A-1) to (A-5) are satisﬁed, the weights are always
positive provided that J (Z) is a monotonic function of scalar Z.I n t h i s c a s e J (Z) and P (Z)
23See Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2001a,b, 2007b).
24More precisely, J(Z) and P(Z) do not have to have distributions that are absolutely continuous with respect to
Lebesgue measure.
25RR
(j − E (J(Z)))
R 1
uD fJ,P (j,t) dtdj duD =C o v( J (Z),D).
19have the same distribution and fJ,P (j,t) collapses to a univariate distribution. The possibility of
negative weights arises when J (Z) is not a monotonic function of P (Z). It can also arise when
there are two or more instruments, and the analyst computes estimates with only one instrument
or a combination of the Z instruments that is not a monotonic function of P (Z) so that J (Z) and
P (Z) are not perfectly dependent. If the instrument is P (Z)( so J (Z)=P (Z)) then the weights
are everywhere non-negative because from (19) E(P (Z) | P (Z) >u D) − E (P (Z)) ≥ 0.I n t h i s
case the density of (P (Z),J(Z)) collapses to the density of P (Z). For any scalar Z we can deﬁne
J (Z) and P (Z) so that they are perfectly dependent, provided J(Z) and P(Z) are monotonic in
Z. More generally, weight (19) is positive if E(J (Z) | P (Z) >u D) is weakly monotonic in uD.
Nonmonotonicity of this conditional expectation can produce negative weights.26
Observe that the weights can be constructed from data on (J,P,D).D a t a o n (J (Z),P(Z))
pairs and (J (Z),D) pairs (for each X value) are all that is required. We can use a smoothed
sample frequency to estimate the joint density fJ,P. Thus, given our maintained assumptions, any
property of the weight, including its positivity at any point (x,uD), can be examined with data.
We present examples of this approach in section 5.
As is evident from Tables 1A and 1B, the weights on ∆MTE(uD) generating ∆IV are diﬀerent from
the weights on ∆MTE (uD) that generate the average treatment eﬀect which is widely regarded as an
important policy parameter (see, e.g. Imbens, 2004) or from the weights associated with the policy
relevant treatment parameter which answers well-posed policy questions (Heckman and Vytlacil,
1999, 2001b, 2005, 2007b). It is not obvious why the weighted average of ∆MTE(uD) produced by
IV is of any economic interest. Since the weights can be negative for some values of uD, ∆MTE(uD)
c a nb ep o s i t i v ee v e r y w h e r ei nuD but IV can be negative. Thus, IV may not estimate a treatment
eﬀect for any person. Therefore, a basic question is why estimate the model with IV at all given
the lack of any clear economic interpretation of the IV estimator in the general case.
Our analysis can be extended to allow for discrete instruments, J (Z). Consider the case where
the distribution of P(Z) (conditional on X) is discrete. The support of the distribution of P(Z)
26If it is weakly monotonically increasing, the claim is evident from (19). If it is decreasing, the sign of the
numerator and the denominator are both negative so the weight is nonnegative.
20contains a ﬁnite number of values p1 <p 2 < ··· <p K and the support of the instrument J (Z)
is also discrete, taking I distinct values, where I and K may be distinct. E(J(Z)|P(Z) ≥ uD) is
constant in uD for uD within any (p ,p  +1) interval, and Pr(P(Z) ≥ uD) is constant in uD for uD
within any (p ,p  +1) interval, and thus ωJ
IV (uD) is constant in uD over any (p ,p  +1) interval. Let
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(p +1 − p ) (22)
where f (ji,p t) is the probability frequency of (ji,p t): the probability that J (Z)=ji and P (Z)=pt.
There is no presumption that high values of J(Z) are associated with high values of P(Z). J(Z)
can be one coordinate of Z that may be positively or negatively dependent on P(Z) which depends
on the full vector. In the case of scalar Z,a sl o n ga sJ(Z) and P(Z) are monotonic in Z,t h e r e
is perfect dependence between J(Z) and P(Z). In this case, the joint probability density collapses
to a univariate density and the weights have to be positive, exactly as in the case with continuous
instruments.27 Our expression for the weight on LATE generalizes the expression presented by
Imbens and Angrist (1994) who in their analysis of the case of vector Z only consider the case
where J(Z) and P(Z) are perfectly dependent because J(Z) is a monotonic function of P (Z).28
27The condition for positive weights is weak monotonicity of λ  in  .I fλ  is monotone increasing in  ,t h en u m e r a t o r
and the denominator are both positive. If λ  is monotone decreasing, the numerator and the denominator are both
negative and the weights are positive.
28In their case, I = K and f (ji,p t)=0 , ∀ i 6= t.
21More generally the weights can be positive or negative for any   but they must sum to 1 over the  .
Monotonicity or uniformity is a property needed with just two values of Z, Z = z1 and Z = z2,
to guarantee that IV estimates a treatment eﬀect. With more than two values of Z we need to
weight the LATEs and MTEs. If the instrument J(Z) shifts P(Z) in the same way for everyone,
it shifts D i nt h es a m ew a yf o re v e r y o n es i n c eD = 1[P (Z) >U D] and Z is independent of UD.I f
J(Z) is not monotonic in P(Z),i tm a ys h i f tP(Z) in diﬀerent ways for diﬀerent people. Negative
weights are a tip-oﬀ of two-way ﬂows.
An alternative and in some ways more illuminating way to derive the weights is to follow Yitzhaki
(1989, 1996) and Yitzhaki and Schechtman (2004) who prove for a general regression function












p (t − E (P))dFP (t)
Var (P)
,
which is exactly the weight (19) when P is the instrument. Thus we can interpret (19) as the weight
on
∂E(Y |P(Z)=p)
∂p when two-stage least squares (TSLS) based on P(Z) as the instrument is used to esti-





= E (Y1 − Y0 | UD = uD)=
∆MTE(uD).29 We discuss Yitzhaki’s derivation which is an argument based on integration by parts
in Appendix C. Our analysis is more general than that of Yitzhaki (1989), Imbens and Angrist
(1994), or Angrist and Imbens (1995) because we allow for instruments that are not monotonic
functions of P (Z). Yitzhaki’s (1989) analysis is more general than that of Imbens and Angrist
(1994) because he does not impose uniformity (monotonicity).
Our simple test for the absence of general heterogeneity based on the linearity of Y in P (Z)
(based on equation 20) applies to the case of LATE for any pair of instruments. An equivalent test
29Yitzhaki’s weights are used by Angrist and Imbens (1995) to interpret what TSLS estimates in the model of
equation (23). Yitzhaki (1989) derives the ﬁnite sample weights used by Imbens and Angrist (See his paper posted
at our website). See also the reﬁnement in Yitzhaki and Schechtman (2004).
22is to check that all pairwise LATEs are the same over the sample support of Z.30
3.3 The Central Role of the Propensity Score
Observe that both (19) and (20) (and their counterparts for LATE (21) and (22)) contain expres-
sions involving the propensity score P(Z), the probability of selection into treatment. Under our
assumptions, it is a monotonic function of the mean utility of treatment, μD (Z).T h ep r o p e n s i t y
score plays a central role in selection models as a determinant of control functions in selection mod-
els (see Heckman and Robb, 1985, 1986) as noted in Section 2. In matching models, it provides a
computationally convenient way to condition on Z (see, e.g. Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Heckman
and Navarro, 2004). For the IV weight to be correctly constructed and interpreted, we need to know
the correct model for P (Z), i.e., we need to know exactly which Z determine P (Z).A sp r e v i o u s l y
noted, this feature is not required in the traditional model for instrumental variables based on re-
sponse homogeneity. In that simpler framework, any instrument will identify μ1(X) − μ0 (X) and
the choice of a particular instrument aﬀects eﬃciency but not identiﬁability. One can be casual
about the choice model in the traditional setup, but not in the model of choice of treatment with
essential heterogeneity. Thus, unlike the application of IV to traditional models, IV applied in the
model of essential heterogeneity depends on (a) the choice of the instrument J (Z), (b) its depen-
dence with P (Z), the true propensity score or choice probability and (c) the speciﬁcation of the
propensity score (i.e., what variables go into Z). Using the propensity score one can identify LIV
and LATE and the marginal returns at values of the unobserved UD.
3.4 Monotonicity, Uniformity and Conditional Instruments
Monotonicity or uniformity condition (IV-3), is a condition on counterfactuals for the same persons
and is not testable. It rules out general heterogeneous responses to treatment choices in response
to changes in Z. The recent literature on instrumental variables with heterogeneous responses is
30Note that it is possible that E (Y | Z) is linear in P (Z) only over certain intervals of UD,s ot h e r ec a nb el o c a l
dependence and local independence of (UD,U 0,U 1).
23thus asymmetric. Outcome equations can be heterogeneous in a general way while choice equations
cannot be. If μD (Z)=γZ,w h e r eγ is a common coeﬃcient shared by everyone, the choice
model satisﬁes the uniformity property. On the other hand, if γ is a random coeﬃcient (i.e., has a
nondegenerate distribution) that can take both negative and positive values, and there are two or
more variables in Z with nondegenerate γ coeﬃcients, uniformity can be violated. Diﬀerent people
can respond to changes in Z diﬀerently, so there is non-uniformity. The uniformity condition can be
violated even when all components of γ are of the same sign if Z is a vector and γ is a nondegenerate
random variable.31
Changing one coordinate of Z, holding the other coordinates at diﬀerent values across people, is
not t h ee x p e r i m e n tt h a td e ﬁnes monotonicity or uniformity. Changing one component of Z, allowing
the other coordinates to vary across people, does not necessarily produce uniform ﬂows toward or
against participation in the treatment status. For example, let μD (z)=γ0 + γ1z1 + γ2z2 + γ3z1z2,
where γ0, γ1, γ2 and γ3 are constants, and consider changing z1 from a common base state while
holding z2 ﬁxed at diﬀerent values across people. If γ3 < 0 then μD (z) does not necessarily satisfy
the uniformity condition. If we move (z1,z 2) as a pair from the same base values to the same
destination values z0, uniformity is satisﬁed even if γ3 < 0,a l t h o u g hμD (z) is not a monotonic
function of z.32
Positive weights and uniformity are distinct issues.33 Under uniformity, and assumptions (A-
31Thus if γ>0 for each component and some components of Z are positive and others are negative, changes from
z0 to z can increase γZ for some and decrease γZ for others since γ are diﬀerent among persons.
32Associated with Z = z is the counterfactual random variable D(z). Associated with the scalar random variable
J (Z) constructed from Z is a counterfactual random variable D(j (z)) w h i c hi si ng e n e r a ld i ﬀerent from D(z).T h e
random variable D(z) is constructed from (13) using 1[μD (z) ≥ V ]. V assumes individual speciﬁc values which
remain ﬁxed as we set diﬀerent z values. From (A-1), Pr(D(z)=1 )=P r ( D =1| Z = z). The random variable
D(j) is deﬁned by the following thought experiment. For each possible realization j of J(Z) deﬁne D(j) by setting
D(j)=D(Z (j)) where Z (j) is a random draw from the distribution of Z conditional on J(Z)=j.S e tD(j) equal
to the choice that would be made given that draw of Z (j).T h u sD(j) is a function of (Z (j),u D).A sl o n ga sw e
draw Z (j) randomly (so independent of Z), we have that (Z (j),U D) ⊥ ⊥ Z so D(j) ⊥ ⊥ Z. There are other possible
constructions of the counterfactual D(j) since there are diﬀerent possible distributions from which Z can be drawn,
apart from the actual distribution of Z. The advantage of this construction is that it equates the counterfactual
probability that D(j)=1given J (Z)=j with the population probability. If the Z were uncertain to the agent,
this would be a rational expectations assumption. See the further discussion in Appendix II posted at the website
for this paper.
33When they analyze the vector case, Imbens and Angrist (1994) analyze instruments that are monotonic functions
of P(Z). Our analysis is more general and recognizes that in the vector case, IV weights may be negative or positive.
241) to (A-5), the weights on MTE for any particular instrument may be positive or negative. The
weights for MTE using P (Z) must be positive as we have shown so the propensity score has a special
status as an instrument. Negative weights associated with the use of J (Z) as an instrument do not
necessarily imply failure of uniformity in Z. Even if uniformity is satisﬁed for Z, it is not necessarily
satisﬁed for J (Z). Condition (IV-3) is an assumption about a vector. Fixing one combination of
Z (when J is a function of Z) or one coordinate of Z does not guarantee uniformity in J even if
there is uniformity in Z.T h eﬂow created by changing one coordinate of Z can be reversed by the
ﬂow created by other components of Z if there is negative dependence among components, even if
ceteris paribus all components of Z aﬀect D i nt h es a m ed i r e c t i o n .W ep r e s e n ts o m ee x a m p l e si n
Section 5.
The issues of positive weights and the existence of one way ﬂows in response to an intervention
are conceptually distinct. Even with two values for a scalar Z, ﬂows may be two way (see equation
(7)). If we satisfy (IV-3) for a vector, so uniformity applies, weights for a particular instrument
may be negative for certain intervals of UD (i.e., for some of the LATE parameters).
If we condition on Z2 = z2,...,Z K = zK using Z1 as an instrument, then a uniform ﬂow
condition is satisﬁed. We call this conditional uniformity. By conditioning, we eﬀectively convert
the problem back to that of a scalar instrument where the weights must be positive. If uniformity
holds for Z1, ﬁxing the other Z at common values, one dimensional LATE/MTE analysis applies.
Clearly, the weights also have to be deﬁned conditionally.
The concept of conditioning on other instruments to produce positive weights for the selected
instrument is a new one, not yet appreciated in the empirical IV literature and has no counterpart
in the traditional IV model. In the conventional model, the choice of a valid instrument aﬀects
eﬃciency but not the deﬁn i t i o no ft h ep a r a m e t e r sa si td o e si nt h em o r eg e n e r a lc a s e . 34
In summary, nothing in the economics of choice models guarantees that if Z is changed from
34In the conventional model with homogeneous responses, a linear probability approximation to P(Z) used as an
instrument would identify the same parameter as P(Z). In the general model, the parameters identiﬁed are diﬀerent.
Replacing P(Z) by a linear probability approximation of it (e.g. E (D | Z)=πZ = J(Z)) is not guaranteed to
produce positive weights for ∆MTE(x,uD) or ∆LATE (x,u0
D,u D), or to replicate the weights based on the correctly
speciﬁed P (Z).
25z to z0, people respond in the same direction to the change. See the general expression (7). The
condition that people respond to choices in the same direction for a common change in Z across
people does not imply that D(z) is monotonic in z for any person in the usual mathematical usage
of the term monotonicity. If D(z) is monotonic in the usual usage of this term, and responses are
in the same direction for all people, then “monotonicity” or “uniformity” condition (IV-3) would
be satisﬁed.
If responses to a common change of Z across persons are heterogenous in a general way, we
obtain (7) as the general case. Vytlacil’s (2002) theorem breaks down and IV cannot be expressed
in terms of a weighted average of LATE terms. Nonetheless, Yitzhaki’s characterization of IV
equation (23) as described in Appendix C remains valid and the weights on
∂E(Y |P=p)
∂p are positive
and of the same form as the weights obtained for MTE (or LATE) when the monotonicity condition
holds.
3.5 Treatment Eﬀects vs. Policy Eﬀects
Even if uniformity condition (IV-3) fails, IV may answer relevant policy questions. By Yitzhaki’s
result (23), IV or TSLS estimates a weighted average of marginal responses which may be pointwise
positive, zero or negative. Policies may induce some people to switch into and others to switch
out of choices, as is evident from equation (7). These net eﬀects are of interest in many policy
analyses. Thus, subsidized housing in a region supported by higher taxes may attract some to
migrate to the region and cause others to leave. The net eﬀect on earnings from the policy is
all that is required to perform cost beneﬁt calculations of the policy on outcomes. If the housing
subsidy is the instrument and the net eﬀect of the subsidy is the parameter of interest, the issue of
monotonicity is a red herring. If the subsidy is exogenously imposed, IV estimates the net eﬀect of
the policy on mean outcomes. Only if the eﬀect of migration on earnings induced by the subsidy
on outcomes is the question of interest, and not the eﬀect of the subsidy, does uniformity emerge
as an interesting condition.
264 Comparing Selection and Local IV Models
W en o ws h o wt h a tl o c a lI Vi d e n t i ﬁes the derivatives of a selection model. Making the X explicit,
in the standard selection model, if the U1 and U0 are scalar random variables that are additively
separable in the outcome equations, Y1 = μ1(X)+U1 and Y0 = μ0(X)+U0. The control function
approach conditions on Z and D. As a consequence of index suﬃciency this is equivalent to
conditioning on P (Z) and D:
E (Y | X,D,Z)=μ0 (X)+[ μ1 (X) − μ0 (X)]D
+K1 (P (Z),X)D
+K0 (P (Z),X)(1− D),
where the control functions are
K1 (P(Z),X)=E(U1 | D =1 ,X,P(Z))
K0 (P(Z),X)=E (U0 | D =0 ,X,P(Z)).
The IV approach does not condition on D.I tw o r k sw i t h
E (Y | X,Z)=μ0 (X)+[ μ1 (X) − μ0 (X)]P(Z) (24)
+K1 (P (Z),X)P(Z)
+K0 (P (Z),X)(1− P(Z)),
the population mean outcome given X,Z.
From index suﬃciency, E (Y | X,Z)=E (Y | X,P(Z)). The MTE is the derivative of this
expression with respect to P(Z), which we have deﬁned as LIV:
∂E(Y | X,P(Z))
∂P(Z)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
P(Z)=p
= LIV(X,p)=MTE(X,p).35
27The distribution of P (Z) and the relationship between J (Z) and P (Z) determine the weight on
MTE.36 Under assumptions (A-1) to (A-5), along with rank and limit conditions (Heckman and
Robb, 1985; Heckman, 1990), one can identify μ1 (X), μ0 (X), K1 (P (Z),X),a n dK0 (P (Z),X).
The selection (control function) estimator identiﬁes the conditional means
E (Y1 | X,P(Z),D=1 )=μ1 (X)+K1 (X,P(Z)) (25a)
and
E (Y0 | X,P(Z),D=0 )=μ0 (X)+K0 (X,P(Z)). (25b)
These can be identiﬁed from nonparametric regressions of Y1 and Y0 on X,Z in each population. To
decompose these means and separate μ1 (X) from K1 (X,P(Z)) without invoking functional form
or curvature assumptions, it is necessary to have an exclusion (a Z not in X).37 In addition there
must exist a limit set for Z given X such that K1 (X,P(Z)) = 0 for Z in that limit set. Otherwise,
without functional form or curvature assumptions, it is not possible to disentangle μ1 (X) from
K1 (X,P(Z)) which may contain constants and functions of X that do not interact with P(Z) (see
Heckman (1990)). A parallel argument for Y0 shows that we require a limit set for Z given X such
that K0 (X,P(Z)) = 0. Selection models operate by identifying the components of (25a) and (25b)
and generating the treatment parameters from these components. Thus they work with levels of
the Y .
The local IV method works with derivatives of (24) and not levels and cannot directly recover
the constant terms in (25a) and (25b). Using our analysis of LIV but applied to YD= Y1D and
Y (1 − D)=Y0(1 − D), it is straightforward to use LIV to estimate the components of the MTE
35Björklund and Moﬃtt (1987) analyze this marginal eﬀect for a parametric generalized Roy model.
36Because LIV does not condition on D, it discards information. Lost in taking derivatives are the constants in
the model that do not interact with P(Z) in equation (24).
37See Heckman and Navarro (2006) for use of semiparametric curvature restrictions in identiﬁcation analysis that
do not require functional form assumptions.
28separately. Thus we can identify
μ1(X)+E (U1 | X,UD = uD)
and
μ0(X)+E (U0 | X,UD = uD)
separately. This corresponds to what is estimated from taking the derivatives of expressions (25a)
and (25b) multiplied by P(Z) and (1 − P(Z)) respectively:38
P(Z)E (Y1 | X,Z,D =1 )
= P(Z)μ1 (X)+P(Z)K1 (X,P(Z))
and
(1 − P(Z))E (Y0 | X,Z,D =0 )
=( 1 − P(Z))μ0 (X)+( 1− P(Z))K0 (X,P(Z)).
Thus the control function method works with levels, whereas the LIV approach works with slopes.
Constants that do not depend on P(Z) disappear from the estimates of the model. The level
parameters are obtained by integration using the formulae in Table 1B.
Misspeciﬁcation of P (Z) (either its functional form or its arguments) and hence of K1 (P (Z),X)
and K0 (P (Z),X) in general produces biased estimates of the parameters of the model under the
control function approach even if semiparametric methods are used to estimate μ0,μ 1,K 0 and K1.
To implement the method, we need to know all of the arguments of Z.T h et e r m sK1 (P (Z),X)
and K0 (P (Z),X) can be nonparametrically estimated so it is only necessary to know P (Z) up
to a monotonic transformation.39 The distributions of U1,U 0 and V do not need to be speciﬁed to
38Björklund and Moﬃtt (1987) use the derivative of a selection model in levels to deﬁne the marginal treatment
eﬀect.
39See Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998).
29estimate control function models (see Powell, 1994).
These problems with control function models have their counterparts in IV models. If we use
a misspeciﬁed P(Z) to identify the MTE or its components, in general we do not identify MTE or
its components. Misspeciﬁcation of P(Z) plagues both approaches.
One common criticism of selection models is that without invoking functional form assump-
tions, identiﬁcation of μ1(X) and μ0(X) requires that P(Z) → 1 and P(Z) → 0 in limit sets.40
Identiﬁcation in limit sets is sometimes called “identiﬁcation at inﬁnity.” In order to identify
ATE = E(Y1 − Y0|X), IV methods also require that P(Z) → 1 and P(Z) → 0 in limit sets,
so an identiﬁcation at inﬁnity argument is implicit when IV is used to identify this parameter.41
The LATE parameter avoids this problem by moving the goal posts and redeﬁning the parameter
of interest away from a level parameter like ATE or TT to a slope parameter like LATE which
diﬀerences out the unidentiﬁed constants. Alternatively, if we deﬁne the parameter of interest to
be LATE or MTE, we can use the selection model without invoking identiﬁcation at inﬁnity.
The IV estimator is model dependent, just like the selection estimator, but in application, the
model does not have to be fully speciﬁed to obtain ∆IV using Z (or J(Z)). However, the distribution
of P (Z) and the relationship between P (Z) and J (Z) generates the weights. The interpretation
placed on ∆IV in terms of weights on ∆MTE depends crucially on the speciﬁcation of P (Z).I nb o t h
control function and IV approaches for the general model of heterogeneous responses, P (Z) plays
ac e n t r a lr o l e .
Two economists using the same instrument will obtain the same point estimate using the same
data. Their interpretation of that estimate will diﬀer depending on how they specify the arguments
in P(Z), even if neither uses P(Z) as an instrument. By conditioning on P (Z), the control function
approach makes the dependence of estimates on the speciﬁcation of P (Z) explicit. The IV approach
is less explicit and masks the assumptions required to economically interpret the empirical output of
an IV estimation. We now turn to some examples that demonstrate the main points of this paper.
40See Imbens and Angrist (1994). Heckman (1990) establishes the identiﬁcation in the limit argument for ATE in
selection models. See Heckman and Navarro (2006) for a generalization to multiple outcome models.
41Thus if the support of P (Z) is not full, we cannot identify treatment on the treated or the average treatment
eﬀect. We can construct bounds. See Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2001a,b, 2007b).
305 Examples Based on Choice Theory
Return to the policy adoption example presented in Section 1. The cost of adopting the policy C is
the same across all countries. Suppose that countries choose to adopt the policy if D∗ > 0 where D∗
is the net beneﬁt of adoption: D∗ =( Y1 − Y0 − C) and ATE = E (β)=E (Y1 − Y0)=μ1−μ0, while
treatment on the treated is E (β | D =1 )=E (Y1 − Y0 | D =1 )=μ1 − μ0 + E (U1 − U0 | D =1 ) .
In this setting, the gross return to the country at the margin is C,i . e . ,
E (Y1 − Y0 | D
∗ =0 )=E (Y1 − Y0 | Y1 − Y0 = C)=C.
Figure 1 presents the standard treatment parameters for the values of the outcome and choice
parameters presented at the base of the ﬁgure. Countries that adopt the policy are above average.
In a model where the cost varies (the generalized Roy model with UC 6=0 ), and C is negatively
correlated with the gain, adopting countries could be below average.42
5.1 Discrete Instruments and the Weights for LATE
Consider what instrumental variables identify in the model of choice and outcomes described below
Figure 2. Let cost C = γZ where instrument Z =( Z1,Z 2).H i g h e rv a l u e so fZ reduce the probability
of adopting the policy if γ ≥ 0, component by component. Consider the “standard” case depicted
in Figure 2A. Increasing both components of discrete-valued Z raises costs and hence raises the
return observed for the country at the margin by eliminating adoption in low return countries. In
general, a diﬀerent country is at the margin when diﬀerent instruments are used.
Figure 3A plots the weights and Figure 3B the components of the weights for the LATE values
using P(Z) as an instrument for the distribution of Z shown at the base of the ﬁgure. Figure 3C
presents the LATE parameter derived using P(Z) as the instrument. The weights are positive as
predicted from equation (22) when J(Z)=P(Z). Thus the monotonicity condition for the weights
in terms of uD is satisﬁed. The outcome and choice parameters are the same as those used to
42See, e.g. Heckman (1976a,b).
31generate Figure 1 and 2. There are four LATE values corresponding to the ﬁve distinct values of
the propensity score for this example. The LATEs exhibit the declining pattern with uD predicted
by the Roy model.
A more interesting case is that depicted in Figure 2B. In that graph, the same Z are used
to generate choices as in Figures 2A and 3. However in this case, the analyst uses Z1 as the
instrument, Z1 and Z2 are negatively dependent and E(Z1 | P(Z) >u D) is not monotonic in uD.
This nonmonotonicity is evident in Figure 4B. This produces the pattern of negative weights shown
in Figure 4A. These are associated with two way ﬂows. Increasing Z1 controlling for Z2 reduces the
probability of country policy adoption. However, we do not condition on Z2 in constructing this
Figure. It is ﬂoating. Two way ﬂows are induced by uncontrolled variation in Z2. For some units,
the strength of the associated variation in Z2 oﬀsets the increase in Z1 and for other units it does
not. Observe that the LATE parameters deﬁned using P (Z) are the same in both examples. They
a r ej u s tw e i g h t e dd i ﬀerently. We discuss the random coeﬃcient choice model generating Figure 2C
in Section 7.
T h eI Ve s t i m a t o rd o e sn o ti d e n t i f yA T E ,T To rT U Tg i v e na tt h eb o t t o mo fF i g u r e3 .C o n d i -
tioning on Z2 produces positive weights, as shown in the weights in Table 2 that condition on Z2.
Conditioning on Z2 eﬀectively converts the problem back into one with a scalar instrument and the
weights must be positive for that case.
By Yitzhaki’s result (23), for any sample size, a regression of Y on P identiﬁes a weighted
average of slopes based on ordered regressors
E(Y |p )−E(Y −1|p −1)
p −p −1 where p  >p  −1 where the weights
are the positive Yitzhaki weights derived in Appendix C, Yitzhaki (1989, 1996) or in Yitzhaki
and Schechtman (2004). The weights are positive whether or not monotonicity (IV-3) holds. If
monotonicity holds, IV is a weighted average of LATEs. Otherwise it is just a weighted average of
ordered (by p ) estimators consistent with two way ﬂows.
325.2 Continuous Instruments
For the case of continuous Z, we present a parallel analysis for the weights associated with the
MTE. Figure 5 plots E(Y | P(Z)) and MTE for the models generated by the parameters displayed
a tt h eb a s eo ft h eﬁgure. In cases I and II, β ⊥ ⊥ D. In case I, this is trivial since β is a constant. In
case II, β is random but selection into D does not depend on β. Case III is the model with essential
heterogeneity (β ⊥ Á ⊥ D) .T h el e f th a n ds i d e( F i g u r e5 A )d e p i c t sE(Y | P(Z)) for the three cases.
Cases I and II make E(Y | P(Z)) linear in P(Z) (see equation 17). Case III is nonlinear in P(Z).
This arises when β ⊥ Á ⊥ D. The derivative of E(Y | P(Z)) is presented in the right panel (Figure 5B).
It is a constant for cases I and II (ﬂat MTE) but declining in UD = P(Z) for the case with selection
on the gain. A simple test for linearity in P(Z) in the outcome equation reveals whether or not the
analyst is in cases I and II (β ⊥ ⊥ D)o rc a s eI I I( β⊥ Á ⊥D). Recall that we keep conditioning on X
implicit.
MTE gives the mean marginal return for persons who have utility P(Z)=uD (P(Z)=uD is
the margin of indiﬀerence). Those with low uD values have high returns. Those with high uD values
have low returns. Figure 5 highlights that MTE (and LATE) identify average returns for persons
at the margin of indiﬀerence at diﬀerent levels of the mean utility function (P(Z)).
Figure 6A plots MTE and LATE for diﬀerent intervals of uD using the model generating Figure 5.
LATE is the chord of E(Y | P(Z)) evaluated at diﬀerent points. The relationship between LATE
and MTE is depicted in the right panel of Figure 6. LATE is the integral under the MTE curve
divided by the diﬀerence between the upper and lower limits.
The treatment parameters associated with case III are plotted in Figure 7. The MTE is the
same as that presented in Figure 5. ATE has the same value for all p.T h ee ﬀect of treatment on
the treated for P (Z)=p, ∆TT(p)=E(Y1 − Y0 | D =1 ,P(Z)=p) declines in p (equivalently, it
declines in uD). Treatment on the untreated given p, ∆TUT(p)=E(Y1−Y0 | D =0 ,P(Z)=p) also











We can generate all of the treatment parameters from ∆TT(p).
Matching on P = p (which is equivalent to nonparametric least squares, given P = p)p r o d u c e sa
biased estimator of TT(p). Matching assumes a ﬂat MTE (average return equals marginal return).43
Therefore it is systematically biased for ∆TT(p) in a model with essential heterogeneity. Making
observables alike makes the unobservables dissimilar. Holding p constant across treatment and
control groups understates TT(p) for low p and overstates it for high p.
We now present additional examples with continuously distributed instruments. See Figure 8.
Instrument Z is assumed to be a random vector with a distribution function given by a mixture of
two normals:
Z ∼ P1N(κ1,Σ1)+P2N(κ2,Σ2),
where P1 i st h ep r o po r t i o ni npo p u l a t i o n1 ,P2 is the proportion in population 2 and P1+P2 =1 .T h i s
produces a model with continuous instruments, where E( ˜ J(Z) | P(Z) >u D) n e e dn o tb em o n o t o n i c
in uD where ˜ J (Z)=J (Z) − E (J (Z)). Such a data generating process for the instrument could
arise from an ecological model in which two diﬀerent populations are mixed (e.g. rural and urban
populations).44
At our web appendix, we derive explicit instrumental variable weights on ∆MTE when Z1 (the
ﬁrst element of Z) is used as the instrument, i.e., J(Z)=Z1 for this case. For simplicity we assume
that there are no X regressors. The probability of selection is generated by μD (Z)=γZ.T h ej o i n t
distribution of (Z1,γZ) is normal within each group.
In our example, the dependence between Z1 and γZ (= FV (γz)=P (Z)) is negative in one
43See Heckman and Vytlacil (2005, 2007b).
44Observe that E(Z)=P1κ1 + P2κ2.
34population and positive in another. Thus in one population, as Z1 increases P (Z) increases. In the
other population as Z1 increases P (Z) decreases. If this second population is suﬃciently big (P1
is small) or the negative dependence in the second population is suﬃciently big, the weights can
become negative because E( ˜ J(Z) | P(Z) >u D) is not monotonic in uD.
We present examples for a conventional normal outcome model generated by the parameters at
the base of Figure 8. The discrete choice equation is a conventional probit as in the other examples.
The outcome equations are linear normal equations. Thus ∆MTE(v), E(Y1 − Y0 | V = v),i sl i n e a r
in v:




A tt h eb a s eo ft h eﬁgure, we deﬁne ¯ β = μ1 −μ0 and α = μ0. The average treatment eﬀects are the
same for all distributions of the Z.
In each of the following examples, we show results for models with vector Z that satisﬁes (IV-1)
and (IV-2) and with γ>0 componentwise, where γ is the coeﬃcient on Z in the cost equation. We
vary the weights and means of the instruments. Ceteris paribus,a ni n c r e a s ei ne a c hc o m p o n e n to f
Z increases Pr(D =1| Z = z). Table 3 (at the base of Figure 8) presents treatment on the treated
(E(Y1 − Y0|D =1 ) ) , treatment on the untreated (E(Y1 − Y0|D =0 ) ) , and the average treatment
eﬀect (E(Y1 − Y0)) produced by our model.
In standard IV analysis, the distribution of Z does not aﬀect the probability limit of the IV
estimator. It only aﬀects its sampling distribution. Figure 8A shows three weights corresponding
to the perturbations of the variance of the instruments in the second component population Σ2
and the means (κ1,κ 2) shown at the base of the ﬁgure in Table 3. The MTE used in all of our
examples is plotted in Figure 8B. The MTE has the familiar shape, reported in Heckman (2001)
and Heckman, Tobias, and Vytlacil (2003) that returns are highest for those with values of v that
make them more likely to get treatment (i.e., low values of v).
The weights ω1 and ω3 correspond to the case where E(Z1 − E (Z1) | P(Z) >u D) is not
monotonic in uD. In theses cases the relationship between Z1 and P(Z) is not the same in the
two subpopulations. The IV estimates range all over the place even though the parameters of the
35outcome and choice model are the same.45 Only the distributions of the instruments are diﬀerent.
Diﬀerent distributions of Z critically aﬀect the probability limit of the IV estimator in the
model of essential heterogeneity. The model of outcomes and choices is the same across all of these
examples. The MTE and ATE parameters are the same. Only the distribution of the instrument
diﬀers. The instrumental variable estimand is sometimes positive and sometimes negative, and
oscillates wildly in magnitude depending on the distribution of the instruments. The estimated
“eﬀect” is often way oﬀ the mark for any desired treatment parameter. These examples show how
uniformity in Z does not translate into uniformity in J (Z) (Z1 in this example). This sensitivity
is a phenomenon that does not appear in the conventional homogeneous response model but is a
central feature of a model with essential heterogeneity.46
5.3 Empirical Example: Using IV to Estimate “The Eﬀect” of High
School Graduation on Wages
The previous examples demonstrate logical possibilities. This subsection shows that these logical
possibilities arise in real data. We study the eﬀects of graduating from high school on wages
using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79). This survey gathers
information at multiple points in time on the labor market activities for men and women born in
the years 1957—1964.
We estimate LATE using log hourly wages at age 30 as the outcome measure. Following a large
body of research (see Mare, 1980), we use the number of siblings and mother’s graduation status as
instruments. Figure 9 plots the weights on LATE using the estimated P(Z). The weights are based
on (22). The LATE parameters are both positive and negative. The weights using siblings as an
instrument are both positive and negative. The weights using P(Z) as an instrument are positive,
as they must following the analysis of Yitzhaki. The two IV estimates diﬀer from each other because
45Since TT and TUT depend on the distribution of P (Z) they are not invariant to changes is the distribution of
the Z.
46We note paranthetically that if we assume that P1 =0(or P2 =0 ) that the weights are always positive even if
we use only Z1 as an instrument and Z1 and Z2 are negatively correlated. This follows from the monotonicity of
E (R | S>c ) in c for vector R. See Heckman and Honoré (1990).
36the weights are diﬀerent. The overall IV estimate is a crude summary of the underlying component
LATEs that are often large and positive and large and negative. We next turn to an extension of
our model to multiple outcomes.
6 Extensions to More than Two Outcomes
Angrist and Imbens (1995) extend their analysis of LATE to an ordered choice model with outcomes
generated by a scalar instrument that can assume multiple values. From their analysis of the eﬀect
of schooling on earnings, it is unclear even under a strengthened “monotonicity” condition, whether
IV estimates the eﬀect of a change of schooling on earnings for a well deﬁn e dm a r g i no fc h o i c e .T o
summarize their analysis, let ¯ S be the number of possible outcome states with associated outcomes
Ys and choice indicators Ds, s =1 ,...,¯ S.T h es in their analysis correspond to diﬀerent levels of





s=1,w h e r eDs(zi)=1if a person assigned instrument value zi
chooses state s. As in the two outcome model, the instrument Z is assumed to be independent of
the potential outcomes {Ys}
¯ S
s=1 as well as the associated indicator functions deﬁned by ﬁxing Z at
zi and zj. Observed schooling for instrument zj is S(zj)=
P¯ S
s=1 sDs(zj). Observed outcomes with
this instrument are Y (zj)=
P¯ S
s=1 YsDs(zj). Angrist and Imbens show that IV (with Z = zi and





{E (Ys − Ys−1 | S(zi) ≥ s>S (zj))} (26)
×
Pr(S(zi) ≥ s>S (zj))
P¯ S
s=2 Pr(S(zi) ≥ s>S (zj))
.
This “causal parameter” is a weighted average of the gross return from going from s − 1 to s for
persons induced by the change in the instrument to move from any schooling level below s to any
schooling level s or above. Thus the conditioning set deﬁning the s component of IV includes people
w h oh a v es c h o o l i n gb e l o ws − 1 at instrument value Z = zj and people who have schooling above
37level s at instrument value Z = zi. In this sum, the average return experienced by some of the
people in the conditioning set for each component conditional expectation does not correspond to
the average outcome corresponding to the gain in the argument of the expectation. In the case
where ¯ S =2 ,a g e n t sf a c eo n l yt w oc h o i c e sa n dt h em a r g i no fc h o i c ei sw e l ld e ﬁned. Agents in each
conditioning set are at diﬀerent margins of choice. The weights are positive but, as noted by Angrist
and Imbens, persons can be counted multiple times in forming the weights. When they generalize
their analysis to multiple-valued instruments, they use the Yitzhaki (1989) weights.
Whereas the weights in equation (26) can be constructed empirically, the terms in braces cannot
be identiﬁed by any standard IV procedure. We present decompositions with components that are
recoverable, whose weights can be estimated from the data and that are economically interpretable.
We generalize LATE to a multiple outcome case where we can identify agents at diﬀerent well
deﬁned margins of choice. Speciﬁcally, we (1) analyze both ordered and unordered choice models;
(2) analyze outcomes associated with choices at various well deﬁned margins; and (3) develop
models with multiple instruments that can aﬀect diﬀerent margins of choice diﬀerently. With our
methods, we can deﬁne and estimate a variety of economically interpretable parameters whereas
the Angrist-Imbens analysis produces a single “causal parameter” (26) that does not answer any
well deﬁned policy problem. We ﬁrst consider an explicit ordered choice model and decompose the
IV into policy useful, identiﬁable, components.
6.1 Analysis of an Ordered Choice Model
Ordered choice models arise in many settings. In schooling models, there are multiple grades. One
has to complete grade s − 1 to proceed to grade s. The ordered choice model has been widely
used to ﬁt data on schooling transitions (Harmon and Walker, 1999; Cameron and Heckman, 1998).
Its nonparametric identiﬁability has been studied (Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman, 2003; Cunha,
Heckman, and Navarro, 2007). It can also be used as a duration model for dynamic treatment
eﬀects with associated outcomes as in Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2007). It also represents the
“vertical” model of the choice of product quality (Prescott and Visscher, 1977; Shaked and Sutton,
381982; Bresnahan, 1987).
Our analysis generalizes the preceding analysis for the binary model in a parallel way. Write
potential outcomes as
Ys = μs(X,Us) s =1 ,...,¯ S.
The ¯ S could be diﬀerent schooling levels or product qualities. We deﬁne latent variables D∗
S =
μD(Z) − V where
Ds = 1[Cs−1(Ws−1) <μ D(Z) − V ≤ Cs(Ws)],s =1 ,...,¯ S,
and the cutoﬀ values satisfy
Cs−1(Ws−1) ≤ Cs(Ws),C 0(W0)=−∞ and C¯ S(W¯ S)=∞.
The cutoﬀs used to deﬁne the intervals are allowed to depend on observed (by the economist)
regressors Ws. In Appendix D we extend the analysis to allow the cutoﬀs to depend on unobserved
regressors as well, following structural analysis along these lines by Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman
(2003) and Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2007). Observed outcomes are: Y =
P¯ S
s=1 YsDs.T h eZ
shift the index generally, the Ws aﬀect s-speciﬁc transitions. Thus, in a schooling example, Z could
include family background variables while Ws could include college tuition or opportunity wages
for unskilled labor.47 Collect the Ws into W =( W1,...,W¯ S),a n dt h eUs into U =( U1,...,U¯ S).
Larger values of Cs(Ws) make it more likely that Ds =1 . The inequality restrictions on the Cs(Ws)
functions play a critical role in deﬁning the model and producing its statistical implications.
Analogous to the assumptions made for the binary outcome model, we assume
(OC-1) (Us,V) ⊥ ⊥ (Z,W)|X, s =1 ,...,¯ S.( Conditional Independence of the Instruments).
(OC-2) μD(Z) is a nondegenerate random variable conditional on X and W. (Rank Condition).
47Many of the instruments studied by Harmon and Walker (1999) and Card (2001) are transition-speciﬁc. Card’s
model of schooling is not suﬃciently rich to make the distinction between the Z and the W.S e e H e c k m a n a n d
Navarro (2006) and Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2007) for more general models of schooling that make these
distinctions explicit.
39(OC-3) The distribution of V is continuous.48
(OC-4) E(|Ys|) < ∞, s =1 ,...,¯ S.( Finite Means).
(OC-5) 0 < Pr(Ds =1 |X) < 1 for s =1 ,...,¯ S for all X.( In large samples, there are some
p e r s o n si ne a c ht r e a t m e n ts t a t e ).
(OC-6) For s =1 ,...,¯ S−1, the distribution of Cs (Ws) conditional on X, Z and the other Cj (Wj),
j =1 ,...,¯ Sj 6= s, is nondegenerate and continuous.49
Assumption (OC-1) to (OC-5) play roles analogous to their counterparts in the two outcome model
(A-1) to (A-5). (OC-6) is a new condition that is key to identiﬁcation of the ∆MTE deﬁned below
f o re a c ht r a n s i t i o n . I ta s s u m e st h a tw ec a nv a r yt h ec h o i c es e t so fa g e n t sa td i ﬀerent margins of
schooling choice without aﬀecting other margins of choice. A necessary condition for (OC-6) to hold
is that at least one element of Ws is nondegenerate and continuous conditional on X,Z and Cj(Wj)
for j 6= s. Intuitively, one needs an instrument (or source of variability) for each transition. The
continuity of the regressor allows us to diﬀerentiate with respect to Cs(Ws),l i k ew ed i ﬀerentiated
with respect to P(Z) to estimate the MTE in the analysis of the two outcome model.
The analysis of Angrist and Imbens (1995) discussed in the introduction to this section makes
independence and monotonicity assumptions that generalize their earlier work. They do not consider
estimation of transition-speciﬁc parameters as we do, or even transition-speciﬁc LATE. We present
ad i ﬀerent decomposition of the IV estimator where each component can be recovered from the
data, and where the transition-speciﬁcM T E sa n s w e rw e l ld e ﬁned and economically interpretable
policy evaluation questions.50
48Absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure.
49Absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure.
50Vytlacil (2006b) shows that their monotonicity and independence conditions imply (and are implied by) a more
general version of the ordered choice model with stochastic thresholds, which appears in Heckman, LaLonde, and
Smith (1999); Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003) and Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2007) and is analyzed in
Appendix D.
40The probability of Ds =1given X,Z and W is generated by an ordered choice model:
Pr(Ds =1| W,Z,X) ≡ Ps(Z,W,X)
=P r ( Cs−1(Ws−1) <μ D(Z) − V ≤ Cs(Ws) | X).
Analogous to the binary case, we can deﬁne UD = FV(V |X = x) so UD ∼ Unif[0,1] under our
assumption that the distribution of V is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure.
The probability integral transformation used extensively in the binary choice model is somewhat
less useful for analyzing ordered choices, so we work with both UD and V in this section of the paper.
Monotonic transformations of V induce monotonic transformations of μD (Z)−Cs (Ws),b u to n ei s
not free to form arbitrary monotonic transformations of μD (Z) and Cs (Ws) separately. Using the
probability integral transformation, the expression for choice s is Ds = 1[FV(μD(Z)−Cs−1(Ws−1)) >
UD ≥ FV(μD(Z) − Cs(Ws))]. Keeping the conditioning on X implicit, we deﬁne Ps(Z,W)=
FV(μD(Z) − Cs−1(Ws−1)) − FV(μD(Z) − Cs(Ws)). It is convenient to work with the probability
that S>s , πs(Z,Ws)=FV(μD(Z) − Cs(Ws)) = Pr
³ P¯ S
j=s+1 Dj =1
¯ ¯ ¯ Z,Ws
´
, π ¯ S(Z,W¯ S)=0 ,
π0(Z,W0)=1and Ps(Z,W)=πs−1(Z,Ws−1) − πs(Z,Ws).
The transition-speciﬁc ∆MTE for the transition from s to s +1is deﬁned in terms of UD.
∆
MTE
s,s+1(x,uD)=E(Ys+1 − Ys | X = x,UD = uD),s =1 ,...,¯ S − 1.
Alternatively, one can condition on V . Analogous to the analysis of the earlier sections of this
paper, when we set uD = πs(Z,Ws) we obtain the mean return to persons indiﬀerent between s and
s +1at mean level of utility πs(Z,Ws).
In this notation, keeping X implicit, the mean outcome Y , conditional on (Z,W),i st h es u m
of the mean outcomes conditional on each state weighted by the probability of being in each state










E(Ys | UD = uD)duD,
where we use conditional independence assumption (OC-1) to obtain the ﬁnal expression. Analogous
to the result for the binary outcome model, we obtain the index suﬃciency restriction E(Y |Z,W)=
E(Y | π(Z,W)),w h e r eπ(Z,W)=[ π1(Z,W1),..., π ¯ S−1(Z,W¯ S−1)]. The choice probabilities encode
all of the inﬂuence of (Z,W) on outcomes.
We can identify πs(z,ws) for (z,ws) in the support of the distribution of (Z,Ws) from the
relationship πs(z,ws)=P r (
P¯ S
j=s+1 Dj =1| Z = z,Ws = ws).T h u s E(Y | π(Z,W)=π) is
identiﬁed for all π in the support of π(Z,W). Assumptions (OC-1), (OC-3), and (OC-4) imply
that E(Y | π(Z,W)=π) is diﬀerentiable in π.S o ∂
∂πE(Y | π(Z,W)=π) is well-deﬁned.51 Thus





s,s+1(UD = πs) (28)
= E(Ys+1 − Ys | UD = πs).
Equation (28) is the basis for identiﬁcation of the transition-speciﬁcM T Ef r o md a t ao n(Y,Z,X).
51For almost all π that are limit points of the support of distribution of π(Z,W).W eu s et h eL e b e s g u et h e o r e m
for the derivative of an integral. Under assumption (OC-6), all points in the support of the distribution of π(Z,W)
will be limit points of that support, and we thus have that ∂
∂πE(Y | π(Z,W)=π) is well deﬁned and is identiﬁed
for (a.e.) π.
42From index suﬃciency, we can express (27) as
E (Y | π(Z,W)=π)=
¯ S X
s=1







E(Ys+1 | πs+1 ≤ UD <π s)








{ms+1(πs+1,π s) − ms(πs,πs−1)}πs
+E (Y1 | π1 ≤ UD < 1)
where ms(πs,πs−1)=E[Ys | πs ≤ UD <π s−1]. In general this expression is a nonlinear func-
tion of (πs,πs−1). This model has a testable restriction of index suﬃciency in the general case:
E(Y |π(Z,W)=π) is a nonlinear function that is additive in functions of (πs,πs−1) so there are no
interactions between πs and πs0 if |s − s0| > 1,i . e . ,
∂2E(Y | π(Z,W)=π)
∂πs∂πs0
=0 if |s − s
0| > 1.
Observe that if UD ⊥ ⊥ Us for s =1 ,...,¯ S,







[E(Ys+1) − E(Ys)]πs + E(Y1).
Deﬁning E(Ys+1)−E(Ys)=∆ATE
s,s+1, E(Y | π(Z,W)=π)=
P¯ S−1
s=1 ∆ATE
s,s+1πs+E(Y1). Thus, under full
independence, we obtain linearity of the conditional mean of Y in the πs’s. This result generalizes
the test for the presence of essential heterogeneity presented in section 3.1 to the ordered case. We
can ignore the complexity induced by the model of essential heterogeneity if E (Y | π(Z,W)=π) is
43linear in the π’s and can use conventional IV estimators to identify well-deﬁned treatment eﬀects.52
6.1.1 What do Instruments Identify in the Ordered Choice Model?
We now characterize what scalar instrument J(Z,W) identiﬁes. When Y is log earnings, it is
common practice to regress Y on D where D is completed years of schooling and call the coeﬃcient
on D ar a t eo fr e t u r n . 53 We seek an expression for the instrumental variables estimator of the eﬀect






s=1 sDs the number of years of schooling attainment. We keep the conditioning on X
implicit. We now present the weights for IV. Their full derivation is presented in Appendix E.
Deﬁne Ks(v)=E
³
˜ J(Z,W) | μD(Z) − cs(Ws) >v
´
Pr(μD(Z) − Cs(W) >v ),w h e r e ˜ J(Z,W)=






























ω(s,v)fV (v)dv =1 , ω(0,v)=0 ,a n dω(¯ S,v)=0 .W ec a nr e w r i t et h i sr e s u l t
52Notice that if UD ⊥ Á ⊥ Us for some s, then we obtain an expression with nonlinearities in πs, πs−1 in expression
(29).
53Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006) present conditions under which this economic interpretation is valid.
44in terms of the MTE, expressed in terms of uD
∆
MTE
































˜ J(Z,W) | πs(Z,Ws) >u D
´
Pr(πs(Z,Ws) ≥ uD). (33)
Compare equations (32) and (33) for the ordered choice model to equations (19) and (20) for the
binary choice model. The numerator of the weights for the ∆MTE for a particular transition in the
ordered choice model is exactly the numerator of the weights implied for the binary choice model,
substituting πs(Z,Ws)=P r ( D>s| Z,Ws) for P(Z)=P r ( D =1| Z).T h e n u m e r a t o r f o r t h e
weights for IV in the binary choice model is driven by the connection between the instrument and
P(Z). The numerator for the weights for IV in the ordered choice model for a particular transition is
driven by the connection between the instrument and πs(Z,Ws). The denominator of the weights is
the covariance between the instrument and D for both the binary and ordered cases. However, in the
binary case the covariance between the instrument and D is completely determined by the covari-
ance between the instrument and P(Z), while in the ordered choice case the covariance depends on
the relationship between the instrument and the full vector [π1(Z,W1),...,π¯ S−1(Z,W¯ S−1)].C o m -
paring our decomposition of ∆IV to decomposition (26), ours corresponds to weighting up marginal
outcomes across well deﬁned and adjacent boundary values experienced by agents having their in-
45struments manipulated whereas the Angrist-Imbens decomposition corresponds to outcomes not
experienced by some of the persons whose instruments are being manipulated.
From equation (33), the IV estimator using J(Z,W) as an instrument satisﬁes the follow-
ing properties. (a) The numerator of the weights on ∆MTE
s,s+1(uD) is non-negative for all uD if
E(J(Z,Ws) | πs(Z,Ws) ≥ πs) is weakly monotonic in πs. For example, if Cov(πs(Z,Ws),D) > 0,
setting J(Z,W)=πs(Z,Ws) will lead to nonnegative weights on ∆MTE
s,s+1(uD), though it may lead to
negative weights on other transitions. A second property (b) is that the support of the weights on
∆MTE
s,s+1 using πs(Z,Ws) a st h ei n s t r u m e n ti s(πMin
s ,πMax
s ) where πMin
s and πMax
s are the minimum
and maximum values in the support of πs(Z,Ws), respectively, and the support of the weights on
∆MTE
s,s+1 using any other instrument is a subset of (πMin
s ,πMax
s ). A third property (c) is that the
weights on ∆MTE
s,s+1 implied by using J(Z,W) as an instrument are the same as the weights on ∆MTE
s,s+1
implied by using E(J(Z,W) | πs(Z,W)) as the instrument.
Suppose that the distributions of Ws, s =1 ,...,¯ S, are degenerate so that the Cs are constants
satisfying C1 < ···<C ¯ S−1. This is the classical ordered choice model. In this case, πs(Z,Ws)=
FV(μD(Z) − Cs) for any s =1 ,...,¯ S. For this special case, using J as an instrument will lead to
nonnegative weights on all transitions if J(Z,Ws) is a monotonic function of μD(Z). For example,
note that μD(Z)−Cs >vcan be written as μD(Z) >C s+F
−1
V (uD).U s i n gμD(Z) as the instrument
leads to weights on ∆MTE
s,s+1(uD) of the form speciﬁed above with ˜ Ks(uD)=
∙







V (uD)+Cs). Clearly, these weights will be nonnegative
for all points of evaluation and will be strictly positive for any evaluation point uD such that
1 > Pr(μD(Z) >F
−1
V (uD)+Cs) > 0. We now present some examples of the weights for IV.
6.1.2 Examples of Weights for IV
Figures 10 and 11 plot the transition-speciﬁc MTEs and the IV weights for the models and distri-
butions of the data at the base of each of the ﬁgures. We work with a normal V and Us,s ow eg e t
linear in V MTEs from standard normal regression theory. The IV estimates using Z and W1 as
instruments are reported transition by transition, along with the overall IV representation (31) into
46its transition-speciﬁcc o m p o n e n t s . 54 T h eI Vw e i g h t sa r ed e ﬁned by equations (32) and (33). The
bottom table presents the transition-speciﬁc treatment parameters.
In Figure 10, the IV weights based on Z and W1 are very diﬀerent. So, correspondingly, are the
IV estimates produced from each instrument, which are far oﬀ the mark of the standard treatment
parameters shown at the bottom of the table. Observe that the IV weight for W1 in the second
transition is negative for an interval of values. This accounts for the dramatically lower IV estimate
based on W1 as the instrument. Figure 11 shows a diﬀerent conﬁguration of (Z,W1,W 2).T h i s
produces negative weights for Z for both transitions and a negative weight for W1 in the second
transition. For both instruments, IV is negative even though both MTEs are positive throughout
most of their range. IV provides a misleading summary of the underlying marginal treatment
eﬀects. In digesting Figures 10 and 11, it is important to recall that all are based on the same
structural model. All have the same MTE and average treatment eﬀects. But the IV estimates are
very diﬀerent solely as a consequence of the diﬀerences in the distributions of instruments across
examples.
These simulations show a rich variety of shapes and signs for the weights. They illustrate a main
point of this paper–that standard IV methods are not guaranteed to weight marginal treatment
eﬀects positively or to produce estimates close to any of the standard treatment eﬀects. Estimators
based on LIV and its extension to the ordered model (28) identify ∆MTE for each transition and
answer policy relevant questions. We now turn to development of a more general unordered model.


















476.2 Extension to Multiple Treatments that are Unordered
In this section, we develop a framework for multiple treatments with a choice equation that is based
on a nonparametric version of the classical multinomial choice model.55 Within this framework,
treatment eﬀects can be deﬁned as the diﬀerence in the counterfactual outcomes that would have
been observed if the agent faced diﬀerent choice sets, i.e., the eﬀect of the individual being forced
to choose from one choice set instead of another.
We analyze the return to the agent of choosing between option j and the next best option.
The analysis of this case is very similar to the analysis presented in Section 3 because it converts
a multiple choice problem to a binary choice problem. Exclusion restrictions allow analysts to
identify generalizations of the LATE parameter and MTE parameters corresponding to the eﬀect
of one choice versus the “next-best” alternative. This identiﬁcation analysis does not require large
support assumptions.
Consider the following model with multiple outcome states. Let J denote the agent’s choice
set, where J contains a ﬁnite number of elements. The reward (psychic and monetary) of choosing
j ∈ J is
Rj(Zj)=ϑj(Zj) − Vj, (34)
where Zj are the agent’s observed characteristics that aﬀect the utility from choosing choice j,a n d
Vj is the unobserved shock to the agent’s utility from choice j.56 Let Z denote the random vector
containing all unique elements of {Zj}j∈J, i.e., Z = union of {Zj}j∈J.W ew r i t eRj(Z) for Rj(Zj),
leaving implicit that Rj(·) only depends on those elements of Z that are contained in Zj.L e tDJ,j
be an indicator variable for whether the agent would choose option j if confronted with choice set
55Heckman and Navarro (2006) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a) present a semiparametric analysis of identiﬁ-
cation for the multinomial choice model.
56More consistent with the notation used in the previous section, we could deﬁne Rj (Zj)=D∗
j. A more precise,






1 if Rj ≥ Rk ∀k ∈ J
0 otherwise.
Let IJ d e n o t et h ec h o i c et h a tw o u l db em a d eb yt h ea g e n ti fc o n f r o n t e dw i t hc h o i c es e tJ: IJ =
j ⇐⇒ DJ,j =1 .L e tYJ b et h eo u t c o m ev a r i a b l et h a tw o u l db eo b s e r v e di ft h ea g e n tf a c e dc h o i c e





where Yj is the potential outcome, observed only if option j is chosen. This expression generalizes
(2). We assume that Yj is determined by Yj = μj(Xj,U j),w h e r eXj is a vector of the agent’s
observed characteristics and Uj is an unobserved random vector. Let X denote the random vector
containing all unique elements of {Xj}j∈J, i.e., X is the union of {Xj}j∈J. W ea s s u m et h a t
(Z,X,IJ,Y J) is observed.58 Deﬁne RJ as the maximum obtainable value given choice set J:






We obtain the traditional representation of the decision process that if choice j is optimal, choice j
is better than the “next best” option:
IJ = j ⇐⇒ Rj ≥ RJ\j,
where J\j means J removing the jth element from the set. More generally, a choice with K optimal
is equivalent to the highest value obtainable from choices in K being higher than the highest value
that can be obtained from choices outside that set,
IJ ∈ K ⇐⇒ RK ≥ RJ\K.
57We will impose conditions such that ties, Rj = Rk for j 6= k, occur with probability zero.
58One possible extension is to the case where one does not observe which choice was made, but only whether one
particular choice was made, i.e., one observes DJ,0 but not IJ. The analysis of Thompson (1989) suggests that this
extension should be possible.
49As we will show, this well-known representation used by Lee (1983), Dahl (2002) and others, is key
for understanding how nonparametric instrumental variables estimates the eﬀect of a given choice
versus the “next best” alternative.
Analogous to our deﬁnition of RJ,w ed e ﬁne RJ(z) to be the maximum attainable value given




Thus, for example, a choice from K is optimal when instruments are ﬁxed at Z = z if RK(z) ≥
RJ\K(z).
We make the following assumptions, which generalize assumptions (A-1) to (A-5) for the multiple
treatment case and are presented in a parallel fashion ((B-2) is stated below):
(B-1) {(Vj,U j)}j∈J is independent of Z conditional on X.




(B-4) E|Yj| < ∞ for all j ∈ J.
(B-5) Pr(IJ = j|X) > 0 for all j ∈ J.
Assumptions (B-1) and (B-3) imply that Rj 6= Rk w.p.1 for j 6= k,s ot h a targmax{Rj} is
unique w.p.1. Assumption (B-4) is required for the mean treatment parameters to be well deﬁned.59
Assumption (B-5) requires that at least some individuals participate in each program for all X.
Deﬁnitions of the treatment parameters only require assumptions (B-1) and (B-3) to (B-5).
However, we use exclusion restrictions to secure identiﬁcation. Let Z[j] denote the jth component
of Z.L e t Z[−j] denote all elements of Z except for the jth component. We will work with two
alternative assumptions for the exclusion restriction.60 Consider
59It allows us to integrate to the limit.
60We work here with exclusion restrictions for ease of exposition. By adapting the analysis of Cameron and
Heckman (1998) and Heckman and Navarro (2006), one can modify our analysis to encompass the case of no exclusion
restrictions if Z contains a suﬃcient number of continuous variables and there is suﬃcient variation in the ϑk function
across k.
50(B-2a) For each j ∈ J, their exists at least one element of Z,s a yZ[j],s u c ht h a tZ[j] is not an
element of Zk, k 6= j, and such that the distribution of ϑj(Zj) conditional on (X,Z[−j]) is
nondegenerate,
or
(B-2b) For each j ∈ J, their exists at least one element of Z,s a yZ[j], such that Z[j] is not an element
of Zk, k 6= j, and such that the distribution of ϑj(Zj) conditional on (X,Z[−j]) is absolutely
continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure.
Assumption (B-2a) requires that the analyst be able to independently vary the index for the
given value function. It imposes an exclusion restriction, that for any j ∈ J, Z contains an
element such that (i) it is contained in Zj; (ii) it is not contained in any Zk for k 6= j, and (iii)
ϑj(·) is a nontrivial function of that element conditional on all other regressors. Assumption (B-
2b) strengthens (B-2a) by adding a smoothness assumption. A necessary condition for (B-2b) is
that the excluded variable have a density with respect to Lebesgue measure conditional on all
other regressors and for ϑj(·) to be a continuous and nontrivial function of the excluded variable.61
Assumption (B-2a) is used to identify a generalization of the LATE parameter. Assumption (B-2b)
will be used to identify a generalization of the MTE parameter. Below, we will strengthen (B-2b)
to a large support assumption to identify ATE though the large support assumption will not be
required for most of our analysis. Assumptions (B-2a) and (B-2b) mirror (A-2) and are analogous
to (OC-2) and (OC-6) in an ordered choice setting.
6.2.1 Deﬁnition of Treatment
Treatment eﬀects are deﬁned as the diﬀerence in the counterfactual outcomes that would have
been observed if the agent faced diﬀerent choice sets. For any two choice sets, K,L ⊂ J,d e ﬁne
61(B-2b) can be easily relaxed to the weaker assumption that the support of ϑj(Zj) conditional on (X,Z[− ])
contains an open interval, or further weakened to the assumption that the conditional support contains at least
one limit point. In these cases, the analysis of this section goes through without change for points within the open
interval or more generally for any limit point.
51∆K,L = YK −YL,t h ee ﬀect of the individual being forced to choose from choice set K versus choice
set L. The conventional treatment eﬀect is deﬁned as the diﬀerence in potential outcomes between
two speciﬁed states,
∆k,  = Yk − Y ,
w h i c hi sn e s t e dw i t h i nt h i sf r a m e w o r kb yt a k i n gK = {k}, L = { }.I ti st h ee ﬀect for the individual
of having no choice except to choose state k versus having no choice except to choose state  .
∆K,L will be zero for agents who make the same choice when confronted with choice set K and
choice set L.T h u s ,IK = IL implies ∆K,L =0 , and we have
∆K,L = 1(IL 6= IK)∆K\L,L (36)








Two cases will be of particular importance for our analysis. First, consider choice set K = {k}
versus choice set L = J\{ k}. In this case, ∆k,J\k is the diﬀerence between the agent’s potential
outcome in state k versus the outcome that would have been observed if he or she had not been
allowed to choose state k.I f IJ = k,t h e n∆k,J\k is the diﬀerence between the outcome in the
agent’s preferred state and the outcome in the agent’s “next-best”state. Second, consider the set
K = J versus choice set L = J\{ k}. In this case, ∆J,J\k is the diﬀerence between the agent’s
observed outcome and what his or her outcome would have been if state k had not been available.
Note that ∆J,J\k = DJ,k∆k,J\k. Thus, there is a trivial connection between the two parameters,
∆J,J\k and ∆k,J\k. This paper focuses on ∆k,J\k,t h ee ﬀect of being forced to choose option k
versus being denied option k. However, one can exploit equation (36) to use the results for ∆k,J\k
to obtain results for ∆J,J\k.
526.2.2 Treatment Parameters
The conventional deﬁnition of the average treatment eﬀect (ATE) is ∆ATE
k,  (x,z)=E(∆k, |X =
x,Z = z), which immediately generalizes to the class of parameters just discussed: ∆ATE
K,L (x,z)=
E(∆K,L|X = x,Z = z). The conventional deﬁnition of the treatment on the treated (TT) parameter
is ∆TT
k, (x,z)=E(∆k, |X = x,Z = z,IJ = k), which generalizes to ∆TT
K,L(x,z)=E(∆K,L|X =
x,Z = z,IJ ∈ K).
We generalize the MTE parameter to be the average eﬀect conditional on being indiﬀerent
between the best option among choice set K versus the best option among choice set L at some
ﬁxed value of the instruments, Z = z:
∆
MTE
K,L (x,z)=E (∆K,L | X = x,Z = z,RK(z)=RL(z)). (37)
We generalize the LATE parameter to be the average eﬀect for someone for whom the optimal
choice in choice set K is preferred to the optimal choice in choice set L at Z =˜ z, but who prefers
the optimal choice in choice set L to the optimal choice in choice set K at Z = z:
∆
LATE




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯





An important special case of this parameter arises when z =˜ z except for elements that enter the








¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
X = x,Z ∈ {z,˜ z},




since RL(z)=RL(˜ z) in this special case.
We have deﬁned each of these parameters as conditional not only on X but also on the
“instruments”Z. In general, the parameters will depend on the Z evaluation point. For example,
53∆ATE







DL, Y . By independence assumption (B-1), we have that Z ⊥ ⊥ {Yj}j∈J | X,b u tDK,k
and DL,  will be dependent on Z conditional on X and thus YK − YL will in general be dependent
on Z conditional on X.62 In other words, even though Z is conditionally independent of each indi-
vidual potential outcome, it is correlated with which choice is optimal within the sets K and L and
thus is related to YK − YL.
6.2.3 Identiﬁcation: Eﬀect of Option j Versus Next Best Alternative
We now establish identiﬁcation of treatment parameters corresponding to averages of ∆j,J\j,t h e
eﬀect of choosing option j versus the preferred option in J if j were not available.63 Recall that
Z[j] is the vector of elements of Zj that do not enter any other choice index, and that Z[−j] is a
vector of all elements of Z not in Z[j].T h eZ[j] thus act as shifters attracting people into or out of
j,b u tn o ta ﬀecting the valuations in the arguments of the other choice functions. We can develop
a parallel analysis to the binary case developed earlier in this paper if we condition on Z[−j].W e
obtain monotonicity or uniformity in this model if the movements among states induced by Z[j] are
the same for all persons conditional on Z[−j] = z[−j] and X = x. For example, ceteris paribus if
Z[j] = z[j] increases, Rj (Zj) increases but the Rk (Zk) are not aﬀected, so the ﬂow is toward state
j.
Let DJ,j be an indicator variable denoting whether option j is selected.
DJ,j = 1
µ
Rj (Zj) ≥ max
 6=j





ϑj (Zj) ≥ Vj +m a x
 6=j




ϑj (Zj) ≥ ˜ Vj
´
,
where ˜ Vj = Vj +m a x  6=j {R  (Z )}.T h u s w e o b t a i n DJ,j = 1
¡
Pj (Zj) ≥ UDj
¢
,w h e r eUDj =
F˜ Vj(Vj +m a x  6=j {R  (Z )}|Z[−j] = z[−j]),w h e r eF˜ Vj is the cdf of ˜ Vj given Z[−j] = z[−j].I n a
62An exception is if K = {k}, L = { }, i.e., both sets are singletons.
63Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b) consider the identiﬁcation of other parameters in the general unordered case.
54format parallel to the binary model, we write
Y = DJ,jYj +( 1− DJ,j)YJ\j, (40)
where YJ\j is the outcome that would be observed if option j were not available. This case is just
a version of the binary case developed in previous sections of the paper. We can deﬁne MTE as
E
¡
Yj − YJ\j | X = x,Z = z,ϑj (zj) − Vj = RJ\j (z)
¢
.
Recall that we have to condition on Z = z because the choice sets are deﬁned over the max of
elements in J\j (see equation (39)).
We now show that our identiﬁcation strategies presented in the preceding part of this paper
extend naturally to the identiﬁcation of treatment parameters for ∆j,J\j. In particular, it is possible
to recover LATE and MTE parameters for ∆j,J\j by use of discrete change IV methods and local
instrumental variable methods, respectively. Averages of the eﬀect of option j versus the next best
alternative are the easiest eﬀects to study using instrumental variable methods and are natural
generalizations of our two outcome analysis.64
Consider identiﬁcation of treatment parameters corresponding to averages of ∆j,J\j using either
a discrete change, Wald form for the instrumental variables estimand or using the local instrumental
variables (LIV) estimand.65 The discrete change, instrumental variables estimand will allow us to
recover a version of the local average treatment eﬀe c t( L A T E )p a r a m e t e r . 66 Let Z[−j] denote the




64Heckman and Navarro (2006) consider identiﬁcation of other parameters but they use identiﬁcation at inﬁnity
arguments not required for standard IV. See the comprehensive discussion in Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b).
65The estimand is the population version of the estimator.
66We use the Z directly in the following manipulations instead of manipulating the {ϑj(Zj)} indices. One can
modify the following analysis to directly use {ϑj(Zj)}, with the disadvantage of requiring identiﬁcation of {ϑj(Zj)}
(e.g. by an identiﬁcation at inﬁnity argument) but with the advantage of being able to follow the analysis of Cameron
and Heckman (1998), Chen, Heckman, and Vytlacil (1998, 1999) and Heckman and Navarro (2006) in not requiring
an exclusion restriction if Z contains a suﬃcient number of continuous variables and there is suﬃcient variation in
the ϑk function across k. See Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b) for a more general analysis.
55˜ z =
£
˜ z[−j], ˜ z[j]¤








E(Y |X = x,Z =˜ z) − E(Y |X = x,Z = z)
Pr(DJ,j =1 |X = x,Z =˜ z) − Pr(DJ,j =1 |X = x,Z = z)
,
where for notational convenience we assume that Z[j] is the last component of Z.W i t h o u t l o s s
of generality, we assume that ϑj(˜ z) >ϑ j(z). The local instrumental variables estimator (LIV)
estimand introduced in Heckman (1997), and developed further in Heckman and Vytlacil (1999,
2001b) allows us to recover a version of the Marginal Treatment Eﬀect (MTE) parameter. Impose
(B-2b), and let Z[j] denote the excluded variable for option j with properties assumed in (B-2b).
Our results are invariant to which particular variable satisfying (B-2b) is used if there are more





∂z[j]E(Y | X = x,Z = z)
∂
∂z[j] Pr(DJ,j =1| X = x,Z = z)
. (41)
∆LIV
j (x,z) is thus the limit form of ∆Wald
j (x,z[−j],z[j], ˜ z[j]) as ˜ z[j] approaches z[j]. Given our previous
assumptions, one can easily show that this limit exists w.p.1. We prove the following identiﬁcation
theorem.
Theorem 1. 1. Assume (B-1), (B-3) to (B-5) and (B-2a). Then ∆Wald
j (x,z[−j],z[j], ˜ z[j])=
∆LATE
j,J\j (x,z, ˜ z) where ˜ z =( z[−j], ˜ z[j]).
2. Assume (B-1), (B-3) to (B-5) and (B-2b). Then ∆LIV
j (x,z)=∆MTE
j,J\j(x,z).
Proof. See Appendix F.
The intuition underlying the proof is simple. Under (B-1), (B-3) to (B-5) and (B-2a) we can
convert the problem of comparing the outcome under j with the outcome under the next best
option. This is an IV version of the selection modelling analysis of Dahl (2002). ∆LATE
j,J\j (x,z, ˜ z) is
the average eﬀect of switching to state j from state IJ\j for individuals who would choose IJ\j at
56Z = z but would choose j at Z =˜ z. ∆MTE
j,J\j(x,z) is the average eﬀect of switching to state j from
state IJ\j (the best option besides state j) for individuals who are indiﬀerent between state j and
IJ\j at the given values of the selection indices (at Z = z,i . e . ,a t{ϑk(Zk)=ϑk(zk)}k∈J).
The mean outcome in state j versus state IJ\j ( t h en e x tb e s to p t i o n )i saw e i g h t e da v e r a g e
over k ∈ J\j of the eﬀect of state j versus state k, conditional on k being the next best option,
weighted by the probability that k is the next best option. For example, for the LATE parameter,
∆
LATE
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X = x,Z ∈ {z,˜ z},
Rj(˜ z) ≥ RJ\j(z) ≥ Rj(z),
IJ\j = k
⎞
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎤
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,
w h e r ew eu s et h ef a c tt h a tRJ\j(z)=RJ\j(˜ z) since z =˜ z except for one component that only
enters the index for the jth option. How heavily each option is weighted in this average depends on
Pr
¡
IJ\j = k | Z ∈ {z,˜ z},R j(˜ zj) ≥ Rk(zk) ≥ Rj(zj)
¢
,
w h i c hi nt u r nd e p e n d so n{ϑk(zk)}k∈J\j.T h eh i g h e rϑk(zk), holding the other indices constant, the
larger the weight given to state k as the base state.
The LIV and Wald estimands depend on the z evaluation point. Alternatively, one can deﬁne
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X = x,
Rj(Z[−j], ˜ z[j])
≥ RJ\j(Z[−j]) ≥ Rj(Z[−j],z[j])
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Thus far, we have only considered identiﬁcation of LATE and MTE, and not of the more standard
treatment parameters ATE and TT. However, following Heckman and Vytlacil (1999), LATE can
approximate ATE or TT arbitrarily well given the appropriate support conditions. Theorem 1 shows
that we can use Wald estimands to identify LATE for ∆j,J\j, and we can thus adapt Heckman and
Vytlacil (1999) to identify ATE or TT for ∆j,J\j.W i t hs u i t a b l em o d i ﬁcation of the weights, their
analysis, summarized in Section 3, goes through as before. Suppose that Z[j] satisﬁes the properties
assumed in (B-2a), and suppose that: (i) the support of the distribution of Z[j] conditional on
all other elements of Z is the full real line; (ii) ϑj(zj) →∞as z[j] →∞ ,a n dϑj(zj) →− ∞as
z[j] →− ∞ .T h e n∆ATE
j,J\j(x,z) and ∆LATE
j (x,z[−j],z[j], ˜ z[j]) are arbitrarily close when evaluated at a
suﬃciently large value of ˜ z[j] and a suﬃciently small value of z[j]. Following Heckman and Vytlacil
(1999), ∆TT
j,J\j(x,z) and ∆LATE
j (x,z[−j],z[j], ˜ z[j]) are arbitrarily close for suﬃciently small z[j].O u r
discussion has focused on the Wald estimands. Alternatively we could also follow Heckman and
Vytlacil (1999, 2001b, 2005) in expressing ATE and TT as integrated versions of MTE. By theorem
67We assume that the support of Z[−j] conditional on ( ˜ Z[j],X) is the same as the support of Z[−j] conditional on
(Z[j],X).
581, we can use LIV to identify MTE and can thus express ATE and TT as integrated versions of the
LIV estimand.






, which we denote as J[j],






























Pj (Z) ≥ uDj | Z[−j] = z[−j]¢
Cov(Z[j],D J,j)
, (43)
where uDj is deﬁned at the beginning of this section and where we keep the conditioning on X = x
implicit.
Note that from Theorem 1, we obtain that
∂








Yj − YJ\j | X = x,Z = z,ϑj (Zj) − Vj = RJ\j (Z)
¤
so we obtain that LIV identiﬁes MTE and linear IV is a weighted average of LIV with the weights
summing to one. These results mirror the results established in the binary case.
In the literature on the eﬀects of schooling (S =
P
j∈J jDJ,j)o ne a r n i n g s( YJ), it is conventional






can be decomposed into economically interpretable components where the weights can be identiﬁed
but the objects being weighted cannot be identiﬁed using local instrumental variables or LATE
without making large support assumptions. However, the components can be identiﬁed using a
structural model.68
68See Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a) and Heckman and Navarro (2006) for analyses of semiparametric identiﬁcation
59The trick we have used in this section comparing outcomes in j to the next best option converts
a general unordered multiple outcome model into a two outcome setup. This eﬀectively partitions
YJ into two components, as in (40). Thus we write








Y  × 1(DJ,j 6=1 ).
In the more general unordered case with three or more choices, to analyze IV estimates of the eﬀect
of S on YJ,w em u s tw o r kw i t hYJ =
P
k∈J DJ,kYk and make multiple comparisons across potential
outcomes. This requires us to move outside of the LATE/LIV framework, which is inherently based
on binary comparisons.69 We consider models that do not impose additive separability in choice
equation (13). This includes a general random coeﬃcient model.
7 Relaxing Additive Separability in the Choice Equation
and allowing for Random Coeﬃcient Choice Models
The analysis of this paper and the entire recent literature on instrumental variables estimators for
models with essential heterogeneity relies critically on the assumption that the treatment choice
equation can be represented in additively separable form (13). The implied uniformity condition
imparts an asymmetry to the entire instrumental variable enterprise. Uniformity also underlies
conventional selection models.
of structural models that can identify all treatment eﬀects and the components of the IV decompositions. See
Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b) and Heckman and Urzua (2006) for further analyses of this case.
69If we partition YJ into two components based on general sets K, L, each with two or more elements, the choice
equation in general is no longer characterized by an additive separability in the error assumption, discussed in
Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) and in the next section, that is required to justify application of LATE and LIV to
identify the MTE. The ordered case previously analyzed has a local property which compares adjacent choices and
eﬀectively makes binary comparisons.
60Responses are permitted to be heterogeneous in a general way, but choices of treatment are
not. In the absence of additive separability, or uniformity, the instrumental variable identiﬁcation
strategy breaks down. Parameters can be deﬁned as weighted averages of an MTE but MTE and the
derived parameters cannot be identiﬁed using any instrumental variables strategy (see Heckman and
Vytlacil, 2001b, 2005, 2007b). This point applies to models with two or more potential outcomes.
For simplicity of exposition, we only analyze the two outcome case.
One natural benchmark nonseparable model is a random coeﬃcient model of choice D =
1[γZ ≥ 0] where γ is a random coeﬃcient vector and γ ⊥ ⊥ (Z,U0,U 1).I f γ is a random coeﬃ-
cient with a nondegenerate distribution and with components that take both positive and negative
values, uniformity (“monotonicity”) can be violated. Figure 2C illustrates this violation. Unifor-
mity can also be violated if we change one coordinate of Z but fail to control for movements in the
other coordinates. See Figure 2B.
To consider a more general case, relax the separability assumption of equation (13) to consider
latent choice index
D
∗ = μD (Z,V ),D = 1[D
∗ ≥ 0], (44)
where μD (Z,V ) is not necessarily additively separable in Z and V ,a n dV is not necessarily a
scalar. In the random coeﬃcient example, V = γ. We maintain assumptions (A-1)-(A-5), with
(A-3) suitably modiﬁed for the random coeﬃcient case.70
In the additively separable case, the MTE has three equivalent interpretations: (i) UD(= FV(V ))
is the only unobservable in the ﬁrst stage decision rule, and MTE is the average eﬀect of treatment
given the unobserved characteristics in the decision rule (UD = uD); (ii) MTE is the average eﬀect
70In special cases, (44) can be expressed in additively separable form. For example if D∗ is weakly separable in
Z and V , D∗ = μD (θ(Z),V) where θ(Z) is a scalar function, and μD(θ(Z),V) is strictly increasing in its ﬁrst
argument, and V is a scalar, for any V , then we can write (44) in the same form as (13):
D = 1
³
θ(Z) ≥ e V
´
where ˜ V = μ
−1
D (0,V) and e V ⊥ ⊥ Z | X, and the inverse function is expressed with respect to the ﬁrst argument.
See Vytlacil (2006a) who considers the vector V case. Vytlacil (2002) shows that any model that does not satisfy
uniformity (or “monotonicity”) will not have a representation in this form. In the random coeﬃcient case where
Z =( 1 ,Z 1) where Z1 is a scalar, and γ =( γ0,γ1) if γ1 > 0 for all realizations, we can write the choice rule in the
form of (13): γ1Z1 > −γ0 ⇒ Z>−
γ0
γ1 and V = −
γ0
γ1. However, this trick does not work in the general case.
61of treatment given that the individual would be indiﬀerent between treatment or not if P (Z)=uD,
where P(Z) is a mean utility function; (iii) the MTE is an average eﬀect conditional on the additive
error term from the ﬁrst stage choice model. Under all interpretations of the MTE, and under the
assumptions (A-1) to (A-5), MTE can be identiﬁed by LIV. The MTE does not depend on Z and
hence it is invariant to policies that shift Z. The MTE integrates up to generate all treatment
eﬀects, policy eﬀects and IV estimands.
The three deﬁnitions are not the same in the general nonseparable case (44). Heckman and
Vytlacil (2001b, 2005, 2007b) extend MTE to the nonseparable case. Local instrumental variables
(LIV) is a weighted average of the MTE with possibly negative weights and does not identify MTE.
Thus, if uniformity does not hold, the deﬁnition of the MTE allows one to integrate it up to obtain
all of the treatment eﬀects. However, the instrumental variables estimator does not identify LATE
or MTE.
7.1 Failure of Index Suﬃciency in General Nonseparable Models
For any version of the nonseparable model, except those that can be transformed to separa-
bility, index suﬃciency fails. To see this most directly, assume that μD (Z,V ) is a continu-
ous random variable.71 Deﬁne Ω(z)={v : μD (z,v) ≥ 0}. In the additively separable case,
P (z) ≡ Pr(D =1| Z = z)=P r ( V ∈ Ω(z)), P (z)=P (z0) ⇔ Ω(z)=Ω(z0). This produces
index suﬃciency so the propensity score orders the unobservables generating choices. In the more
general case (44), it is possible to have (z,z0) values such that P (z)=P (z0) and Ω(z) 6= Ω(z0) so
index suﬃciency does not hold. The Z’s enter the model more generally, and the propensity score
no longer plays the central role it plays in separable models.
7.2 The Support of the Propensity Score
The nonseparable model can also restrict the support of P (Z). For example, consider a normal
random coeﬃcient choice model with a scalar regressor (Z =( 1 ,Z 1)).A s s u m e γ0 ∼ N (0,σ2
0),
71Absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure.
62γ1 ∼ N (¯ γ1,σ2










where Φ is the cumulative distribution of a standard normal. If the support of Z1 is R,i nt h es t a n -
dard additive model (σ2
1 =0 ) , P (z1) has support [0,1].W h e nσ2
1 > 0, the support is strictly within
the unit interval.72 In the special case when σ2








cannot, in general, identify ATE, TT or any treatment eﬀect requiring the endpoints 0 or 1 using
IV or control function strategies.73 In addition, the IV weights presented in Section 3 no longer
apply. IV now fails as a method for estimating interpretable causal eﬀects and treatment eﬀects.
Other approaches to estimation must be adopted if a fully symmetric model of heterogeneity is
entertained.
7.3 Violations of Uniformity
The uniformity or monotonicity assumption can be violated for any vector Z. One source of
violations is nonseparability between Z and V in (44). The random coeﬃcient model model is
one intuitive model where separability fails. Even if (44) is separable in Z and V ,u n i f o r m i t ym a y
fail in the case of vector Z, where we use only one function of Z as the instrument, and do not
condition on the remaining sources of variation in Z, as we demonstrated by examples in Section 5.
If we condition appropriately, we retain monotonicity but get a new form of instrumental variable














73The random coeﬃcient model for choice may explain the support problems for P(Z) n o t e db ym a n ya n a l y s t s .
See Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998).
638 Summary and Conclusions
This paper considers the application of the method of instrumental variables to models where
responses to treatment are heterogeneous, agents make treatment choices based in part on this
heterogeneity and some components of heterogeneity are unobserved by the economist. We call
this a model with essential heterogeneity. Intuitions about IV that are valid for the homogeneous
model are often applied inappropriately to the model of essential heterogeneity. In a model with
essential heterogeneity, diﬀerent instruments satisfying the traditional deﬁnition of an instrumental
variable deﬁne diﬀerent economic parameters. This is not the case in the classical IV literature that
assumes that responses to treatment are homogeneous. Since diﬀerent instruments identify diﬀerent
parameters, the traditional emphasis in the econometric theory literature of eﬃciently combining
instruments, or using Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests to check for endogeneity by comparing estimates
from diﬀerent instruments, is inappropriate.
In the model with essential heterogeneity, the speciﬁcation of the choice equation (Pr(D =1| Z))
aﬀects the interpretation of any IV estimator. This feature is absent in the classical model where
speciﬁcation of the full instrument list and choice model is irrelevant to the interpretation of what
IV estimates. Two economists using the same valid instrument and the same outcome equations but
maintaining diﬀerent models of economic choice will interpret the same point estimate diﬀerently.
So will two economists using the same instrument and the same Z variables in P(Z) but using
distributions of Z that are diﬀerent. The agnostic and robust features of IV in its classical setting
disappear in a model with essential heterogeneity. We develop a simple procedure which can be
applied to test whether, in a given data set, the analyst has to worry about the complications
resulting from essential heterogeneity or whether they can be ignored in identifying treatment
parameters.
We clarify the concept of monotonicity introduced by Imbens and Angrist (1994) and note that
uniformity is a better term for their concept. Additionally, we show that this concept is not the same
as the term “monotonicity”used in the literature to deﬁne positive IV weights on treatment eﬀects.
IV weights may be nonpositive even when uniformity is satisﬁed for a vector Z, if an instrument other
64than P(Z) (or a function of P(Z)) is used. Uniformity plus conditioning on unused instruments
are required to produce positive weights in the case of vector Z. We demonstrate these points with
both theoretical and empirical examples.
Positivity of weights is required to interpret IV estimates as treatment eﬀects. We argue, how-
ever, that many interesting policy questions do not require treatment eﬀects. Policy eﬀects and
treatment eﬀects are distinct. We develop new software for estimating MTE and the weights for
t h et w oo u t c o m em o d e l .
We also compare the method of IV with the method of control functions. In the more general
setting studied here, the method of control functions is explicit in formulating its identifying as-
sumptions and recovers interpretable parameters. We establish a strong relationship between LIV
and LATE and control function models. LIV and LATE estimate the derivatives (diﬀerences) of the
level functions identiﬁed by the control function approach. When we use IV and its extensions to
answer the traditional questions addressed by the control function method, the same large sample
support assumptions are required to identify model intercepts.
We highlight the central role of the propensity score in IV and control function methods. Us-
ing the propensity score and the distributions of X and Z we can generate instrument-invariant
parameters and weights for any instrument from a common set of parameters. The propensity
score or choice probability is more than a computational device, as it is in matching. It shows
up as a fundamental feature of both IV and control function models in the presence of essential
heterogeneity.
We develop both ordered and unordered choice models with associated outcomes that extend
the binary choice model for essential heterogeneity. The unordered model extends the two outcome
model in a natural way. The ordered model places some special structure on it. In the context
of the ordered model, we deﬁne transition-speciﬁc treatment parameters (∆MTE
s,s+1(u)). We show
how to estimate these parameters using transition-speciﬁc instruments. These instruments identify
parameters that can be linked to speciﬁc choice models.
We explain why the model of essential heterogeneity as currently formulated in the recent litera-
65ture on instrumental variables is asymmetric. It features heterogeneity (nonuniformity) of responses
to treatment but assumes uniformity in response to the variables generating choice of treatment.
We present new results for a random coeﬃcient model that allows for nonuniformity in responses
of choices to instruments and responses of outcomes to treatment.
66A Deriving the IV Weights on MTE
We consider instrumental variables conditional on X = x using a general function of Z as an
instrument. Let J(Z) be any function of Z such that Cov(J(Z),D | X = x) 6=0 . Consider the
population analog of the IV estimator,
[Cov(J (Z),Y | X = x)] / [Cov(J (Z),D| X = x)].
First consider the numerator of this expression,
Cov(J (Z),Y | X = x)=E ([J (Z) − E (J (Z) | X = x)]Y | X = x)
= E ((J (Z) − E (J (Z) | X = x))(Y0 + D(Y1 − Y0)) | X = x)
= E ((J (Z) − E (J (Z) | X = x))D(Y1 − Y0) | X = x)
where the second equality comes from substituting in the deﬁnition of Y and the third equality fol-
lows from assumption conditional independence assumption (A-2). Deﬁne ˜ J(Z) ≡ J(Z)−E(J(Z) |
X = x).T h e n
Cov(J (Z),Y | X = x)
= E
³
















˜ J(Z) 1[UD ≤ P(Z)] | X = x,UD
´
×E (Y1 − Y0 | X = x,UD)










E( ˜ J(Z) | X = x,P(Z) ≥ uD)Pr(P(Z) ≥ uD | X = x)








MTE(x,uD)E( ˜ J(Z) | X = x,P(Z) ≥ uD)Pr(P(Z) ≥ uD | X = x)duD,
67where the ﬁrst equality follows from plugging in the model for D; the second equality follows from
the law of iterated expectations with the inside expectation conditional on (X = x,Z,UD);t h e
third equality follows from conditional independence assumption (A-2); the fourth equality follows
from Fubini’s Theorem and the law of iterated expectations with the inside expectation conditional
on (X = x,UD = uD);t h eﬁfth equality follows from the normalization that UD is distributed
uniformly [0,1] conditional on X;a n dt h eﬁnal equality follows from plugging in the deﬁnition of
∆MTE. Next consider the denominator of the IV estimand. Observe that by iterated expectations
Cov(J (Z),D| X = x)=C o v( J (Z),P(Z) | X = x).









E( ˜ J(Z) | X = x,P(Z) ≥ uD)




Cov(J (Z),P(Z) | X = x)
. (A.2)
where by assumption Cov(J (Z),P(Z) | X = x) 6=0 .
If J(Z) and P(Z) are continuous random variables then a second interpretation of the weight
can be derived from (A.2) by noting that
Z
(j − E (J (Z) | X = x))
Z 1
uD
fP,J (t,j | X = x) dtdj
=
Z








fP|J,X (t | J(Z)=j,X = x) dt
=1 − FP|J,X (uD | J(Z)=j,X = x)
= SP|J(Z),X (uD | J(Z)=j,X = x)
where SP|J,X (uD | J(Z)=j,X = x) is the probability of (P (Z) ≥ uD) given J (Z)=j and X = x.










J (Z),S P|J,X (UD | J(Z),X= x) | X = x
¢.
For ﬁxed uD and x evaluation points, SP|J,X (uD | J(Z),X= x) is a function of the random variable
J(Z). The numerator of the preceding expression is the covariance between J(Z) and the probability
that the random variable P(Z) is greater than the evaluation point uD conditional on J(Z).
For a ﬁxed x evaluation point, SP|J,X (UD | J(Z),X= x) is a given function of the random
variables UD and J(Z). The denominator of the above expression is the covariance between J(Z) and
the probability that the random variable P(Z) is greater than the random variable UD conditional
on J(Z) and X = x.
Thus, it is clear that if the covariance between J (Z) and the conditional probability that
(P (Z) >u D) given J (Z) is positive for all uD, then the weights are positive. The condition
is trivially satisﬁed if J (Z)=P (Z), so the weights are positive and IV estimates a gross treatment
eﬀect.
If the J (Z) and P (Z) are discrete valued, we obtain expressions and (21) and (22) in the text.
69B Computational Aspects: Estimating the MTE, the Treat-
ment Parameters, and the Weights
We illustrate the computational aspects of this paper using the linear and separable version of the
model of essential heterogeneity introduced in Section 3. More precisely, we consider the following
framework:
Y1 = α + ϕ + β1X + U1
Y0 = α + β0X + U0






0 if I ≤ 0
where (U0,U 1,V) are independent of Z conditional on X, but U0,U 1 and V are not independent
(even conditioning on X).
Using the same arguments presented in Section 3, we can show that
E (Y |X = x,P (Z)=p)=α + β0x +( ( β1 − β0)x)p + K(p), (B.2)
where P(Z) represents the propensity score or probability of selection (Pr(D =1 |Z)), p is a par-
ticular evaluation value of the propensity score and
K(p)=ϕp + E (U1 − U0|D =1 ,P(Z)=p)p. (B.3)
Equations (B.2) and (B.3) are closely related to the control function approach (see Section 4).
70B.1 The Estimation of the Propensity Score and The Identiﬁcation of
the Relevant Support
The ﬁrst step in the computation of the MTE is to estimate the probability of participation or
propensity score, Pr(D =1 |Z = z)=P(z). This probability can be estimated using diﬀerent
methods. In this appendix, we assume V ∼ N(0,1) and thus estimate P(z) u s i n gap r o b i tm o d e l .
Let b γ denote the estimated value of γ in equation (B.1). The predicted value of the propensity
score (conditional on Z = z), b P(z), is then computed as b P(z)=P r ( b γZ > V|Z = z)=Φ(b γz) where
Φ represents the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random variable.
The predicted values of the propensity score allow us to deﬁne the values of uD over which the
MTE can be identiﬁed. In particular, as emphasized by Heckman and Vytlacil (2001b), identiﬁca-
tion of the MTE depends critically on the support of the propensity score.74 The larger the support
of the propensity score, the bigger the set over which the MTE can be identiﬁed.
In order to deﬁne the relevant support we ﬁrst estimate the frequencies of the predicted propen-
sity scores in the samples of treated (D =1 ) and untreated (D =0 ) individuals. These frequencies
can be computed using smoothed sample histograms. In both subsamples the grid Γ of values of
b P(z) speciﬁes the number of points at which the histogram is to be evaluated.
Let P  denote the set of evaluation points (coming from the grid) such that
P  = {p ∈ Γ |  <Pr(b P(z)=p | D =  )} with   =0 ,1 and  >0,
so P  represents the set of values of p for which we compute frequencies in the range ( ,1] using the
subsample of individuals reporting D =   (  =0 ,1). Notice that the extreme value 0 is excluded
from P . Finally, if we denote by P the set of evaluation points used to deﬁne the relevant support
74Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998, 1996), and Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998) also discuss the
importance of the propensity score. They present empirical evidence that failure of the full support condition is a
major source of evaluation bias.







¯ ¯ ¯ <min
³
Pr(b P(z)=p | D =0 ) ,Pr(b P(z)=p | D =1 )
´o
for  >0. Therefore, the MTE is deﬁned only for those evaluations of b P(z) for which we obtain
positive frequencies for both subsamples.
In practice, after identifying the relevant or common support of the propensity score, it is
necessary to adjust the sample. In particular, the observations for which b P(z) i sc o n t a i n e di nt h e
common support are kept. The rest of the sample is dropped. From this point on, our analysis
refers to the resulting sample.
B.2 Semiparametric Estimation of the Marginal Treatment Eﬀect in
Practice
Before presenting the steps used in computing the semiparametric estimate of the MTE, recall
equation (16) and make the conditioning on X explicit:
∆
LIV(x,uD)=
∂E(Y |X = x,P(Z)=p)
∂p




This expression indicates that in general the computation of the MTE involves the estimation of
the partial derivative of the expectation of the outcome Y (conditional on X = x and P(Z)=p)
with respect to p. This is the method of local instrumental variables introduced in Heckman and
Vytlacil (2001b). However, since we are considering the linear and separable version of the model
of essential heterogeneity, we can use equations (B.2) and (B.3) to show that
∂E(Y |X = x,P(Z)=p)
∂p
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
p=uD
=( β1 − β0)x +
∂K(p)
∂p
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
p=uD
(B.4)
72Thus, in order to compute the MTE we need to estimate values for (β1 − β0) and
∂K(p)
∂p .N o t i c e
that without additional assumptions, the estimation of this last term requires the utilization of
nonparametric techniques.
Diﬀerent approaches can be used in the estimation of (B.4). The following steps describe a
semiparametric one.75
Step 1 We ﬁrst estimate the coeﬃcients β0 and (β1 − β0) in (B.2) using a nonparametric version
of the double residual regression procedure.76 I no r d e rt od os o ,w es t a r tb yﬁtting a local
linear regression (LLR) of each regressor in (B.2) on the predicted propensity score b P(z).
Notice that if nX represents the number of variables in X, this step involves the estimation
of 2 × nX local linear regressions. This is because equation (B.2) also contains terms of the
form Xk b P(z) for k =1 ,...,n X.W e u s e t h e k-th regressor in (B.2), Xk, to illustrate the
LLR procedure. Let Xk(j) and b P(z(j)) denote the values of the k-th regressor and predicted
propensity score for the j-th individual, respectively, the latter evaluated at the Z (j) that is
observed for the individual. The estimation of the LLR of Xk on b P(z) requires obtaining the
values of {θ0(p),θ 1(p)} for a set of values of p c o n t a i n e di nt h es u p p o r to fb P(z) such that








Xk(j) − θ0 − θ1(b P(z(j)) − p)
´2





where Ψ(·) and h represent the kernel function and the bandwidth, respectively and where θ0
and θ1 are parameters.77 In practice, we can use the set of all values of b P(z) to deﬁne the set
of evaluation points (p) in the LLR. This allows us to estimate the predicted value of Xk for
75A FORTRAN code implementing this routine is available at jenni.uchicago.edu/underiv.
76In the textbook case Y = λ1X1 + λ2X2 +   where   is assumed independent of X1 and X2, a double residual
regression procedure estimates λ2 using two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the estimated residuals of regressions of Y
on X2 and X1 on X2 are computed. Let εY and εX1 denote these estimated residuals. In the second stage, λ2 is
estimated from the regression of εY on εX1.
77The selection of optimal bandwidth is extensively studied in the nonparametric literature. In the code available
on our website two procedures computing optimal bandwidth in the context of local regressions are implemented.
The ﬁrst one is the standard leave-one-out crossvalidation procedure. The second procedure is the reﬁned bandwidth
selector described in Section 4.6 of Fan and Gijbels (1996). Our code allows the utilization of three diﬀerent kernel
functions: Epanechnikov, Gaussian and Biweight kernel functions.
73each individual in the sample.78
Let b Xk(j) denote the predicted value of Xk for the j-th individual. This procedure is repeated
for each of the 2 × nX regressors in the outcome equations.
Step 2 Given the predicted values of the 2 × nX regressors b Xk (k =1 ,...,2 × nX), we now generate
the residual for each regressor k and person j,
b eXk(j)=Xk(j) − b Xk(j) with k =1 ,...,2 × nX.
We denote by b eXk the vector of residuals (b eXk(1),b eXk(2),...,b eXk(N))0,a n db yb eX the matrix
of residuals such that its k-th column contains the vector b eXk.
Step 3 As in the standard double residual regression procedure, we also need to estimate a LLR of
Y on b P(z). The same procedure as the one described in Step 1 is used in this case. Let b Y (j)
denote the resulting predicted value of outcome Y for the j-th individual.
Step 4 With b Y (j) in hand, we generate the residual associated with outcome Y for each person j,
b eY(j)=Y (j) − b Y (j).
Following the notation used before, we denote by b eY the vector of residuals (b eY(1),...,b eY(N))0.
Step 5 Finally, we can estimate the values of β0 and (β1 − β0) in (B.2) from a regression of b eY on
b e0
X.S p e c i ﬁcally,
h








Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) use a similar double residual regression ar-
gument to characterize the selection bias in a semiparametric setup that arises from using
nonexperimental data.
78An alternative could be to use P as the set of evaluation points. In this case, in order to compute the predicted
value of Xk for each individual, it would be necessary to replace its value of the predicted propensity scores by the
closest value in P.
74Step 6 From equation (B.4) we observe that after obtaining the estimated value of (β1 − β0),o n l y
∂K(p)/∂p remains to be estimated. However, with the estimated values of β0 and (β1 −β0)
in hand, this term can be estimated using standard nonparametric techniques. To see why,
notice that we can write




+ e v, (B.5)
where e Y = Y − b β0X −
³
( \ β1 − β0)X
´














can be interpreted as the conditional expectation E
³
e Y |P(Z)=b P(z)
´
.
Let b ϑ1 (p) denote the nonparametric estimator of ∂K(p)/∂p. N o t i c et h a tw ed e ﬁne this
estimator as a function of p instead of b P(z). This is because, unlike the case of the LLR
estimators described in Step 1, we now use a subset of values of b P(z) to deﬁne the set of
points (p) on which our estimator is evaluated. In particular, we use the set P to deﬁne this
set of evaluation points. As shown above, P contains the values of b P(z) for which we obtain
positive frequencies in both the D =0and D =1samples. Thus, b ϑ1 (p) is computed as








e Y (j) − ϑ0 − ϑ1
³
b P(z(j)) − p
´´2





where as before Ψ(·) and h represent the kernel function and the bandwidth, respectively.79
Step 7 The LIV estimator of the MTE is ﬁnally computed as follows:
∆




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
p=uD
= [ MTE(x,uD)
and is evaluated over the set of p’s contained in P.
79The code posted on our website allows the utilization of local polynomials of higher order to approximate





to compute a discrete version of the derivative. Furthermore, it allows the estimation of the
MTE under the assumption of joint normalilty of the error terms.
75B.3 The IV Weights
Let J be the instrument. For simplicity we assume that J is a scalar. The extension to the vector









⎠Pr(P(Z) >u D | X = x)
Cov(J,D | X = x)
(B.6)
In order to compute the weight:
Step 1 We approximate b E(J|X = x) using a linear projection, i.e., we assume J = λ
0X + V where
E(V |X = x)=0 ,s ob E(J|X = x)=b λ
0
x.
Step 2 For each value of uD we generate the auxiliary indicator function 1[P(Z) >u D] which is equal
to 1 if the argument of the function is true and 0 otherwise.
Step 3 We use linear projections to estimate E(J|X = x,P(Z) >u D). More precisely, we use
OLS to estimate the equation J(uD)=λ
0
J(uD)X + V using only the observations for which




Step 4 Since Pr(P(Z) >u D|X = x)=P r ( 1[P(Z) >u D]=1 |X = x) we use a probit model (for each
value of uD) to estimate this probability. Let c Pr(P(Z) >u D|X = x) denote the estimated
probability.
Step 5 We repeat steps 2,3 and 4 for each value of uD..
Step 6 With b E(J|X = x), b E(J|X = x,P(Z) >u D) and c Pr(P(Z) >u D|X = x) in hand we can













(E (J | P(Z) >u D,X= x) − E (J | X = x))





so with the numerator in hand, it is straightforward to obtain the value of the covariance
(conditional on X).
B.4 The Treatment Parameter Weights
We use the Treatment on the Treated (TT) parameter to illustrate the computation of the treatment
parameter weights. The TT weight is:
ωTT(x,uD)=
Pr(P(Z) >u D|X = x) R
Pr(P(Z) >u D|X = x)duD
and consequently, we can use c Pr(P(Z) >u D|X = x) to estimate the ωTT(x,uD). As in the case of
ωJ
IV(x,uD), with the estimated value of c Pr(P(Z) >u D|X = x) in hand, we can directly obtain the
value for
R
Pr(P(Z) >u D|X = x)duD, using the fact
R
ωTT(x,uD)duD =1 .
B.5 The IV and Treatment Parameter Estimators
The MTE and the weights can be used to construct the diﬀerent estimators. In particular, if ∆IV
J (x)













where ∆TT(x) represents the TT estimator conditional on X = x. Similar expressions exist for the
other treatment parameters. Therefore, provided with ∆LIV(x,uD) and the estimated values for the
weights we can compute b ∆IV
J (x) and b ∆TT(x). These estimators depend on the particular value of
X considered. In order to compute their unconditional estimated values we need to integrate X




























C Yitzhaki’s Theorem (Yitzhaki, 1989)
Assume (Y,X) i.i.d., E(|Y |) < ∞, E(|X|) < ∞, g(X)=E(Y | X), g0(X) exists and E (|g0 (x)|) <


















E (X − μX | X>t )Pr(X>t ).
Proof.








































E (X − μX | X>t )Pr(X>t ). ¥
Notice that:
(i) T h ew e i g h t sa r en o n - n e g a t i v e(ω(t) ≥ 0).
(ii) They integrate to one (use an integration by parts formula)
(iii) =0at t = −∞,∞
79We get the formula in the text when in place of X,w eu s eP(Z) and the domain of P(Z) is suitably
deﬁned. We apply Yitzhaki’s result to the treatment eﬀect model:
Y = α + βD+ ε,
E (Y | P(Z)) = α + E (β | D =1 ,P(Z))P (Z)
= α + E (β | P(Z) >u D,P(Z))P (Z)
= g(P(Z)).











∂ [E (β | D =1 ,P(Z))]P (Z)
∂P(Z)





t [ϕ − E(P(Z))] fP (ϕ)dϕ
Cov(P(Z),D)
.
Under (A-2) to (A-5) and separability, g0(t)=∆MTE(t) but g0(t)=LIV, for P (Z) as an instrument.
D Generalized Ordered Choice Model with Stochastic Thresh-
olds
The ordered choice model presented in the text with parameterized, but nonstochastic, thresholds
is analyzed in Cameron and Heckman (1998) who establish its nonparametric identiﬁability under
the conditions they specify. Treating the Ws (or components of it) as unobservables, we obtain the
generalized ordered choice model analyzed in Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003) and Cunha,
Heckman, and Navarro (2007). In this Appendix, we present the main properties of this more
80general model.
The thresholds are now written as Qs + Cs(Ws) in place of Cs(Ws),w h e r eQs is a random
variable. In addition to the order on the Cs(Ws) in the text, we impose the order Qs + Cs (Ws) ≥
Qs−1 + Cs−1(Ws−1), s =2 ,...,¯ S − 1. W ei m p o s et h er e q u i r e m e n tt h a tQ¯ S = ∞ and Q0 = −∞.
The latent index D∗
s is as deﬁned in the text, but now
Ds = 1[Cs−1(Ws−1)+Qs−1 <μ D(Z) − V ≤ Cs(Ws)+Qs]
= 1[ s−1(Z,Ws−1) − Qs−1 >V ≥  s(Z,Ws) − Qs],
where  s(Z,Ws)=μD(Z) − Cs(Ws).U s i n gt h ef a c tt h a t s(Z,Ws) − Qs <  s−1(Z,Ws−1) − Qs−1,
we obtain
1[ s−1(Z,Ws−1) − Qs−1 >V ≥  s(Z,Ws) − Qs]
= 1[V + Qs−1 <  s−1(Z,Ws−1)]
−1[V + Qs ≤  s(Z,Ws)].
The nonparametric identiﬁability of this choice model is established in Carneiro, Hansen, and
Heckman (2003) and Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2007). We retain assumptions (OC-2) to
(OC-6), but alter (OC-1) to
(OC-1)0 (Qs,U s,V) ⊥ ⊥ (Z,W) | X, s =1 ,...,¯ S.
Vytlacil (2006b) shows that this model with no transition speciﬁc instruments (with Ws de-
generate for each s) implies and is implied by the independence and monotonicity conditions of
Angrist and Imbens (1995) for an ordered model. Deﬁne Q =( Q1,...,Q¯ S).R e d e ﬁne πs(Z,Ws)=
FV +Qs(μD(Z)+Cs(Ws)) and deﬁne π(Z,W)=[ π1(Z,W1),...,π¯ S−1(Z,W¯ S−1)].R e d e ﬁne UD,s =












 s−1(Z,Ws−1) − Qs−1















E (1[V + Qs−1 <  s−1(Z,Ws−1)]Ys | Z,W)











−∞ E (Ys | V + Qs−1 = t)dFV +Qs−1(t)
−
R  s(Z,Ws)











0 E (Ys | UD,s−1 = t)dt
−
R πs(Z,Ws)




We thus have the index suﬃciency restriction that E(Y | Z,W)=E(Y | π(Z,W)),a n di nt h e
general case ∂
∂πs [E(Y | π(Z,W)=π)] = E(Ys+1 − Ys | UD,s = πs). Also, notice that we have the
restriction that ∂2
∂πs∂πs0 [E(Y | π(Z,W)=π)] = 0 if |s − s0| > 1. Under full independence between
Us and V + Qs, s =1 ,...,¯ S, we can test full independence for the more general choice model by




s,s+1(x,u)=E(Ys+1 − Ys | X = x,UD,s = u),






Since π(Z,Ws) can be nonparametrically identiﬁed immediately from πs(Z,Ws)=P r
³P¯ S
j=s+1 Dj =1| Z,Ws
´
we have that the above oﬀset equality immediately implies identiﬁcation of MTE for all evaluation
82points within the appropriate support.
The policy relevant treatment eﬀect is deﬁned analogously. Recall that Ha
s is deﬁned as the
cumulative distribution function of μD(Z) − Cs(Ws).W eh a v et h a t
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E(Ys | V = v,Q = q)
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where V , Qs enter additively, and
∆
PRTE








































E(Ys+1 − Ys | UD,s = t){ ˜ H
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s is the cumulative distribution function of the random variable FUD,s(μD(Z) − Cs(Ws)).
E Derivation of the Weights for IV in the Ordered Choice
Model
We ﬁrst derive Cov(J(Z,W),Y). Its derivation is typical of the other terms needed to form (30)



































≤ V<   s−1(Z,Ws−1)
⎤
⎥




where the ﬁrst equality comes from the deﬁnition of Y and the law of iterated expectations, and the
second equality follows from linearity of expectations and independence assumption (OC-1). Let
Hs(·) equal Ha
s(·) for a equal to the policy that characterizes the observed data, i.e., Hs(·) is the
cumulative distribution function of  s(Z,Ws),
H
a
s(t)=P r (  s(Z,Ws) ≤ t)
=P r ( μD(Z) − Cs(Ws) ≤ t).
84Using the law of iterated expectations, we obtain














1[V<   s−1(Z,Ws−1)]





















[E(Ys+1 − Ys | V = v)Ks(v)] fV(v)dv
where Ks(v)=E
³
˜ J(Z,W) |  s(Z,Ws) >v
´
(1−Hs(v)) a n dw eu s et h ef a c tt h a tK¯ S(v)=K0(v)=
0. Now consider the denominator of the IV estimand,






































1[V<   s−1(Z,Ws−1)]
















































ω(s,v)fV(v)dv =1 , ω(0,v)=0 ,a n dω(¯ S,v)=0 .
FP r o o f o f T h e o r e m 1
Proof. The basic idea is that we can bring the model back to a two choice set up of j versus
the “next best”option. We prove the result for the second assertion, that ∆LIV
j (x,z) recovers
the marginal treatment eﬀect parameter. The ﬁrst assertion, that ∆Wald
j (x,z[−j],z[j], ˜ z[j]) recovers
a LATE parameter, follows from a trivial modiﬁcation to the same proof strategy. Recall that
RJ\j(z)=m a x i∈J\j {Ri(z)} and that IJ\j =a r g m a x i∈J\j (Ri(Z)).W e m a y w r i t e Y = YJ\j +
DJ,j(Yj − YJ\j).W eh a v e
Pr(DJ,j =1| X = x,Z = z)
=P r
¡




ϑj(zj) ≥ RJ\j(z) − Vj | X = x,Z = z
¢
.
Using independence assumption (B-1), RJ\j(z) −Vj is independent of Z conditional on X,s ot h a t
Pr(DJ,j =1| X = x,Z = z)
=P r
¡
ϑj(zj) ≥ RJ\j(z) − Vj | X = x
¢
.
86ϑk(·) does not depend on z[j] for k 6= j by assumption (B-2b), and thus RJ\j(z) does not depend on
z[j],a n dw ew i l lt h e r e f o r ew i t ha na b u s eo fn o t a t i o nw r i t eRJ\j(z[−j]) for RJ\j(z).W r i t eF(·;x,z[−j])
for the distribution function of RJ\j(z[−j]) − Vj conditional on X = x.T h e n
















where f(·;x,z[−j]) is the density of RJ\j(z[−j]) − Vj conditional on X = x.C o n s i d e r
E (Y | X = x,Z = z)=E
¡




DJ,j(Yj − YJ\j) | X = x,Z = z
¢
.
As a consequence of (B-1), (B-2b), (B-3) and (B-4), we have that E
¡
YJ\j | X = x,Z = z
¢
does not
depend on z[j]. Using the assumptions and the law of iterated expectations, we may write
E
¡









¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
X = x,Z = z,












¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
X = x,Z[−j] = z[−j],
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Combining results, we have
∂
∂z[j]E (Y |X = x,Z = z)
∂
∂z[j] Pr(DJ,j =1 |X = x,Z = z)
= E
¡














Yj − YJ\j | X = x,Z = z,Rj(z)=RJ\j(z)
¢
provides the stated result. The proof for the LATE result follows from a parallel argument using
discrete changes in the instrument.
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95Table 1A
Treatment Eﬀects and Estimands as Weighted Averages
of the Marginal Treatment Eﬀect
ATE(x)=E (Y1 − Y0 | X = x)=
  1
0 ∆MTE(x,uD)duD
TT(x)=E (Y1 − Y0 | X = x,D =1 )=
  1
0 ∆MTE(x,uD)ωTT(x,uD)duD
TUT(x)=E (Y1 − Y0 | X = x,D =0 )=
  1
0 ∆MTE (x,uD) ωTUT (x,uD) duD
Policy Relevant Treatment Eﬀect (x)=E (Ya  | X = x) − E (Ya | X = x)=
  1
0 ∆MTE (x,uD) ωPRTE (x,uD) duD












   1
uD f(p | X = x)dp
  1
E(P | X = x)
ωTUT (x,uD)=
   uD
0 f (p|X = x)dp
  1
E ((1 − P)|X = x)
ωPRTE(x,uD)=
 





   1
uD(J(Z) − E(J(Z) | X = x))
 
fJ,P|X (j,t | X = x) dtdj
  1
Cov(J(Z),D| X = x)
ωOLS(x,uD)=1+
E(U1 | X = x,UD = uD)ω1(x,uD) − E(U0 | X = x,UD = uD)ω0(x,uD)
∆MTE(x,uD)
ω1(x,uD)=
   1
uD f(p | X = x)dp
  
1
E(P | X = x)
 
ω0(x,uD)=
   uD
0 f(p | X = x)dp
  1
E((1 − P) | X = x)
Source: Heckman and Vytlacil (2005)Figure 1. Distribution of Gains
The Roy Economy









 AT  E
T U  T
β
0.2 C=1.5
     Return to Marginal Agent
= Y1 - Y0
TT= 2.666, TUT= −0.632
Return to Marginal Agent = C =1 .5
ATE = µ1 − µ0 = ¯ β =0 .2
The Model
Outcomes Choice Model
Y1 = µ1 + U1 = α + ¯ β + U1 D =
 
1i fD∗ > 0
0i fD∗ ≤ 0
Y0 = µ0 + U0 = α + U0
General Case
(U1 − U0) ⊥  ⊥ D
ATE  =TT =TUT
The Researcher Observes (Y,D,C)
Y = α + βD+ U0 where β = Y1 − Y0
Parameterization
α =0 .67 (U1,U 0) ∼ N (0,Σ) D∗ = Y1 − Y0 − C





C =1 .5Figure 2. Monotonicity
The Extended Roy Economy































































β = Y1 - Y0
Outcomes Choice Model
Y1 = α + ¯ β + U1 D =
 
1i fY1 − Y0 − γZ > 0
0i fY1 − Y0 − γZ ≤ 0
Y0 = α + U0 with γZ = γ1Z1 + γ2Z2
Parameterization





,α =0 .67, ¯ β =0 .2,γ=( 0 .5,0.5) (except in Case C)
Z1 = {−1,0,1} and Z2 = {−1,0,1}
A. Standard Case B. Changing Z1 without Controlling for Z2 C. Random Coeﬃcient Case
z −→ z  z −→ z  or z −→ z   z −→ z 
z =( 0 ,1) and z  =( 1 ,1) z =( 0 ,1), z  =( 1 ,1) and z   =( 1 ,−1) z =( 0 ,1) and z  =( 1 ,1)
γ is a random vector
  γ =( 0 .5,0.5) and     γ =( −0.5,0.5)
where   γ and     γ are two realizations of γ
D(γz) ≥ D(γz ) D(γz) ≥ D(γz )o rD(γz) <D (γz  ) D
 




    γz 
 
and D(  γz) <D(  γz )
For all individuals Depending on the value of z  or z   Depending on value of γFigure 3. IV Weight and Its Components under Discrete Instruments when P (Z)i st h eI n s t r u m e n t
The Extended Roy Economy














































The model is the same as the one presented below Figure 2.




∆LATE (p ,p  +1)λ  = −0.09
∆LATE (p ,p  +1)=
E (Y |P(Z)=p +1) − E (Y |P(Z)=p )
p +1 − p 
=








Φ−1 (1 − p )
  
p +1 − p 
λ  =( p +1 − p )
K  
i=1





=( p +1 − p )
K  
t> 
(pt − E (P (Z)))f (pt)
Cov(Z1,D)
Joint Probability Distribution of (Z1,Z 2) and the Propensity Score
(joint probabilities in ordinary type (Pr(Z1 = z1,Z 2 = z2)); propensity score in italics (Pr(D =1 |Z1 = z1,Z 2 = z2)))
Z1\Z2 −10 1
−1 0.02 0.02 0.36
0.7309 0.6402 0.5409
0 0.3 0.01 0.03
0.6402 0.5409 0.4388
1 0.2 0.05 0.01
0.5409 0.4388 0.3408
Cov(Z1,Z 2)=−0.5468Figure 4. IV Weight and Its Components under Discrete Instruments when Z1 is the Instrument
The Extended Roy Economy
































The model is the same as the one presented below Figure 2. The values of the treatment parameters are the same as the





∆LATE (p ,p  +1)λ  =0 .1833
λ  =( p +1 − p )
I  
i=1





Joint Probability Distribution of (Z1,Z 2) and the Propensity Score
(joint probabilities in ordinary type (Pr(Z1 = z1,Z 2 = z2)); propensity score in italics (Pr(D =1 |Z1 = z1,Z 2 = z2)))
Z1\Z2 −10 1
−1 0.02 0.02 0.36
0.7309 0.6402 0.5409
0 0.3 0.01 0.03
0.6402 0.5409 0.4388
1 0.2 0.05 0.01
0.5409 0.4388 0.3408





and Conditional Local Average Treatment Eﬀect
 
∆LATE (p ,p  +1|Z2 = z2)
 
when Z1 is the Instrument (given Z2 = z2)
The Extended Roy Economy
Z2 = −1 Z2 =0 Z2 =1
P (−1,Z 2)=p3 0.7309 0.6402 0.5409
P (0,Z 2)=p2 0.6402 0.5409 0.4388
P (1,Z 2)=p1 0.5409 0.4388 0.3408
λ1 0.8418 0.5384 0.2860
λ2 0.1582 0.4616 0.7140
∆LATE (p1,p 2) −0.2475 0.2497 0.7470
∆LATE (p2,p 3) −0.7448 −0.2475 0.2497
∆IV
Z1|Z2=z2 −0.3262 0.0202 0.3920





∆LATE (p ,p  +1|Z2 = z2)λ |Z2=z2 =
I−1  
 =1
∆LATE (p ,p  +1|Z2 = z2)λ |Z2=z2
∆LATE (p ,p  +1|Z2 = z2)=
E (Y |P(Z)=p +1,Z 2 = z2) − E (Y |P(Z)=p ,Z 2 = z2)
p +1 − p 
λ |Z2=z2 =( p +1 − p )
I  
i=1
(z1,i − E (Z1|Z2 = z2))
I  
t> 
f (z1,i,p t|Z2 = z2)
Cov(Z1,D)
=( p +1 − p )
I  
t> 
(z1,t − E (Z1|Z2 = z2))f (z1,t,p t|Z2 = z2)
Cov(Z1,D)
Probability Distribution of Z1 Conditional on Z2 (Pr(Z1 = z1|Z2 = z2))
z1 Pr(Z1 = z1|Z2 = −1) Pr(Z1 = z1|Z2 =0 ) P r ( Z1 = z1|Z2 =1 )
−1 0.0385 0.25 0.9
0 0.5769 0.125 0.075
1 0.3846 0.625 0.025Figure 5. Conditional Expectation of Y on P(Z) and the Marginal Treatment Eﬀect (MTE)
The Extended Roy Economy
A. E(Y |P(Z)=p)B . ∆ MTE(uD)













Cases I and II
Case III














Cases I and II
Case III
Outcomes Choice Model
Y1 = α + ¯ β + U1 D =
 
1i fD∗ > 0
0i fD∗ ≤ 0
Y0 = α + U0
Case I Case II Case III
U1 = U0 U1 − U0 ⊥ ⊥ D U1 − U0 ⊥  ⊥ D
¯ β =ATE=TT=TUT=IV ¯ β =ATE=TT=TUT=IV ¯ β =ATE =TT =TUT =IV
Parameterization
Cases I, II and III Cases II and III Case III
α =0 .67 (U1,U 0) ∼ N (0,Σ) D∗ = Y1 − Y0 − γZ





Z ∼ N (µZ,ΣZ)





γ =( 0 .5,0.5)Figure 6. The Local Average Treatment Eﬀect
The Extended Roy Economy
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∆LATE(p ,p  +1)=
E (Y |P(Z)=p +1) − E (Y |P(Z)=p )
p +1 − p 
=
p +1  
p 
∆MTE(uD)duD




Y1 = α + ¯ β + U1 D =
 
1i fD∗ > 0
0i fD∗ ≤ 0
Y0 = α + U0 with D∗ = Y1 − Y0 − γZ
Parameterization











α =0 .67, ¯ β =0 .2,γ=( 0 .5,0.5)Figure 7. Treatment Parameters and OLS/Matching as a function of P(Z)=p














M T E (p)
A T E ( p )
T U T (p)
M a t c h i n g ( p )
Parameter Deﬁnition Under Assumptions (*)
Marginal Treatment Eﬀect E [Y1 − Y0|D∗ =0 ,P(Z)=p] ¯ β + σU1−U0Φ−1(1 − p)
Average Treatment Eﬀect E [Y1 − Y0|P(Z)=p] β





















Note: Φ(·) and φ(·) represent the cdf and pdf of a standard normal distribution, respectively. Φ−1 (·) represents the inverse of Φ(·).
(*): The model in this case is the same as the one presented below Figure 6.Figure 8. Marginal Treatment Eﬀect and IV Weights using Z1 as the Instrument when
Z =( Z1,Z 2) ∼ p1N(κ1,Σ1)+p2N(κ2,Σ2) for diﬀerent values of Σ2
A. IV Weights B. ∆MTE (v)


































Y1 = α + ¯ β + U1 D =
 
1i fD∗ > 0
0i fD∗ ≤ 0
Y0 = α + U0 D∗ = Y1 − Y0 − γZ and V = −(U1 − U0)
Parameterization





,α =0 .67, ¯ β =0 .2
Z =( Z1,Z 2) ∼ p1N(κ1,Σ1)+p2N(κ2,Σ2)






1 =0 .98 ; γ =( 0 .2,1.4)
Table 3. IV estimator and Cov(Z2,γZ) associated with each value of Σ2
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−2.261 0.2 1.310 −0.859 −0.30Figure 9. IV Weights - The Eﬀect of Graduating from High School
Sample of High School Dropouts and High School Graduates
White Males - NLSY79
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Y = Log per-hour wage at age 30, Z1 = Number of Siblings in 1979, Z2 = Mother is a High School Graduate
D =
 
1 if High School Graduate
0 if High School Dropout
IV Estimates
(boostrap std. errors in parenthesis - 100 replications)
Instrument Value




Joint Probability Distribution of (Z1,Z 2) and the Propensity Score
(joint probabilities Pr(Z1 = z1,Z 2 = z2) in ordinary type; propensity score Pr(D =1 |Z1 = z1,Z 2 = z2) in italics)
Z2\Z1 0 1 2 3 4
0 0.07 0.03 0.47 0.121 0.06
1.0 0.54 0.86 0.72 0.61
1 0.039 0.139 0.165 0.266 0.121
0.94 0.89 0.90 0.85 0.93
Cov(Z1,Z 2)=−0.066 - Number of Observations= 1,702Figure 10. Treatment Parameters and IV
The Generalized Ordered Choice Roy Model under Normality: Case I
A. Z as Instrument B. W1 as Instrument














1,2 (  )
∆MTE





















1,2 (  )
∆MTE










Y1 = α + β1 + U1 Ds = 1[Ws−1 <γ Z− V  Ws]
Y2 = α + β2 + U2 s =1 ,2,3
Y3 = α + β3 + U3
Parameterization





10 .16 0.2 −0.3
0.16 0.64 0.16 −0.32












Cov(U2 − U1,V)=−0.02 Cov(U3 − U2,V)=−0.08
β1 =0 ;β2 =0 .025; β3 =0 .3; γ =1
















Treatment Parameters and Their Values
Parameter Value
ATE12 = E (Y2 − Y1)0 .025
ATE23 = E (Y3 − Y2)0 .275
TT12 = E (Y2 − Y1|D2 =1 ) 0 .0271
TT23 = E (Y3 − Y2|D3 =1 ) 0 .1871
TUT12 = E (Y2 − Y1|D1 =1 ) 0 .0047
TUT23 = E (Y3 − Y2|D2 =1 ) 0 .2854
∗∆IVZ is decomposed as:
∆IVZ =
Z
E (Y2 − Y1|V = v)ωZ (1,v)fV (v)dv +
Z





An analogous decomposition applies to ∆
IVW1.Figure 11. Treatment Parameters and IV
The Generalized Ordered Choice Roy Model under Normality: Case II
A. Z as Instrument B. W1 as Instrument










1,2 (  )
∆MTE


















1,2 (  )
∆MTE









Y1 = α + β1 + U1 Ds = 1[Ws−1 <γ Z− V  Ws]
Y2 = α + β2 + U2 s =1 ,2,3
Y3 = α + β3 + U3
Parameterization





10 .16 0.2 −0.3
0.16 0.64 0.16 −0.32












Cov(U2 − U1,V)=−0.02 Cov(U3 − U2,V)=−0.08
β1 =0 ;β2 =0 .025; β3 =0 .3; γ =1
















Treatment Parameters and Their Values
Parameter Value
ATE12 = E (Y2 − Y1)0 .025
ATE23 = E (Y3 − Y2)0 .275
TT12 = E (Y2 − Y1|D2 =1 ) 0 .0283
TT23 = E (Y3 − Y2|D3 =1 ) 0 .1754
TUT12 = E (Y2 − Y1|D1 =1 ) 0 .0025
TUT23 = E (Y3 − Y2|D2 =1 ) 0 .2898
†See the footnote below Figure 10 for details of the decomposition of ∆IVZ. An analogous decomposition is used for ∆
IVW1.